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The concept of attention is central to theorizing in learning as well as in working memory. However,
research to date has yet to establish how attention as construed in one domain maps onto the other. We
investigate two manifestations of attention in category- and cue-learning to examine whether they might
provide common ground between learning and working memory. Experiment 1 examined blocking and
highlighting effects in an associative learning paradigm, which are widely thought to be attentionally
mediated. No relationship between attentional performance indicators and working memory capacity
(WMC) was observed, despite the fact that WMC was strongly associated with overall learning
performance. Experiment 2 used a knowledge restructuring paradigm, which is known to require
recoordination of partial category knowledge using representational attention. We found that the extent
to which people successfully recoordinated their knowledge was related to WMC. The results illustrate
a link between WMC and representational—but not dimensional—attention in category learning.
Keywords: attention, working memory capacity, knowledge restructuring, associative learning, category
learning
Performance in many aspects of day to day life would be
extremely difficult without the ability to hold multiple objects in
mind at once. For example, reading a novel involves semantic
processing of individual words in addition to the ability to relate
those words to other aspects of the text such as plot and character
development. The active and selective maintenance of different
cognitive objects is the domain of working memory. Accordingly,
the construct of working memory has considerable scope and
serves a number of functions concerning the selection, mainte-
nance, and manipulation of goal-relevant information (Oberauer,
Su¨, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittman, 2000; Oberauer, Su¨, Wil-
helm, & Wittman, 2003).
Much theorizing has linked people’s working memory capacity
(WMC) to the notion of attention. For example, some theorists
have interpreted WMC as the number of cognitive objects that can
either be simultaneously apprehended in the so-called “focus” of
attention (e.g., Cowan, 2001, 2005) or immediately entered into
the focus of attention (Oberauer, 2009). Other theorists have
emphasized the supervisory function of the working memory sys-
tem, identifying WMC with control over executive attention (e.g.,
Engle, 2002; Engle & Kane, 2004; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, &
Conway, 1999; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane,
Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007), which expresses itself in the
ability to simultaneously maintain relevant task information while
also suppressing irrelevant information. In support, WMC has
been found to be associated with resistance to interference in
attentional-control situations without any memory involvement:
Kane et al. (2001) showed that in a simple “antisaccade” task, in
which a cue flashed on one side of the screen requires an orienting
response to the opposite side, WMC was a predictor of perfor-
mance. Similarly Kane and Engle (2003) showed that WMC
mediated performance on the classic Stroop task (i.e., naming the
color ink of an incongruent word; e.g., “BLUE” presented in red
ink).
The close theoretical relationship between attention and WMC
invites the question of how WMC relates to other cognitive do-
mains that ascribe a key role to attention. Under an executive-
attention view, WMC might be expected to correlate with perfor-
mance in learning tasks that involve deployment of selective
attention. This article thus explores the relationship between WMC
and two distinct manifestations of attention in category and asso-
ciative learning—namely, dimensional attention on the one hand
and representational attention on the other.
Attention and Category Learning
The idea that attention plays a role in category learning has a
long theoretical history. Indeed, attention is a staple construct in
contemporary models of categorization (see Kruschke, 2008, for a
recent review). In categorization, attention is most often thought of
in terms of a weighting of inputs to some stage of processing. The
notion that stimulus information is selectively weighted has roots
in classical views on attention (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Neisser,
1967; Treisman, 1969) and remains at the core of modern theories
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of attention (e.g., Logan, 2002, 2004). To illustrate, a schematic
overview of the stages of processing involved in categorization is
shown in Figure 1. The figure shows a number of different pro-
cessing stages and identifies two points at which attentional mech-
anisms have been thought to operate. Perceptual processes provide
raw input that is subsequently weighted by dimensional attention,
such that information along attended dimensions is accentuated,
whereas information along unattended dimensions is attenuated
(Nosofsky, 1986). Traditionally, only a single type of category
representation is assumed to be available, in which case that
representation is activated by the dimensionally weighted stimulus
input, usually on the basis of similarity.
More recent models have investigated the possibility that mul-
tiple types of category representations might be available—for
example, people may have access to a rule representation in
addition to an exemplar-based representation to handle exceptions
to the rule (e.g., Erickson & Kruschke, 1998). When multiple
category representations are available, representational attention
determines which one is selected, after which the selected category
representation is activated by the dimensionally weighted stimulus
input.1 Activation of the category representation then drives a
decision mechanism, resulting in an overt category response.
The attention-categorization link was first proposed by Shepard,
Hovland, and Jenkins (1961), who examined the rates at which
people learned to categorize stimuli defined along three binary-
valued dimensions (e.g., large/small, red/green, triangle/square).
Shepard et al. found that the rates at which people learned the six
basic “problem types” that can be created from three binary
dimensions corresponded to the number of relevant stimulus di-
mensions involved: The Type I problem (one relevant dimension)
was learned the fastest, followed by Type II (two relevant dimen-
sions), followed by the rest (three relevant dimensions). Moreover,
learning rates were faster than could be predicted on the basis of
stimulus generalization alone, with the discrepancy between theory
and data being largest for the simpler problems (viz., Types I and
II). Shepard et al. conjectured that selective attention to relevant
stimulus dimensions might account for the discrepancy. Nosofsky
(1984) provided theoretical support for this notion, showing that an
extended version of Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) context model
with differentially weighted stimulus dimensions produced a far
better approximation to the data (see also Kruschke, 1992; Love,
Medin, & Gureckis, 2004). The need for selective dimensional
attention to quantitatively account for the data of Shepard et al.
(1961) has been repeatedly underscored by replications of the
classic study (Lewandowsky, 2011; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKin-
ley, 1994). In all instances, models that did not incorporate some
form of selective dimensional attention fit the data less well than
models that did include selective attention (viz., ALCOVE;
Kruschke, 1992). Moreover, the theoretically expected allocation
of attention across stimulus dimensions in the Shepard problems
has recently been demonstrated more directly using eye-tracking
analysis (Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a). There is now little dispute
about the role of selective dimensional attention in category learn-
ing.
Dimensional attention can be readily linked to the executive-
attention view of working memory: A crucial property of execu-
tive attention is the ability to suppress irrelevant information,
preventing it from intruding into working memory (Engle & Kane,
2004; Kane et al., 2001, 2007). If dimensional attention operates
analogously, it follows that it should come at a cost: Whereas
learning about attended dimensions will be enhanced, unattended
dimensions should be actively ignored, and the effects of that
inattention should persist even when the task no longer demands it.
This prediction has been confirmed by studies using dimensional
relevance shifts (Kruschke, 1996b). In these tasks, an initially
learned category structure is replaced with a new stimulus-
response mapping later in learning. The stimulus dimensions that
are relevant to the second structure may or may not overlap with
those relevant to the first structure. Whereas people can learn the
new structure quite quickly if it involves the same diagnostic
dimensions, people are quite slow to learn the second structure
when previously irrelevant dimensions are suddenly made relevant
to the task. More recently, Hoffman and Rehder (2010) have
produced eye-tracking data confirming the attentional locus of the
effect of relevance shifts on subsequent learning: People fixate less
frequently on a previously irrelevant stimulus dimension even if it
is suddenly made relevant to the altered category structure.
The apparent conceptual and empirical similarities between
dimensional and executive attention suggest that WMC may be
associated with attentional aspects of category learning. However,
the limited available evidence has been negative. In a recent
1 For convenience, we discuss selection of a category representation as
if it were an all-or-none process, but note that more flexible weighting
schemes are used in practice. We further elaborate on the distinction
between dimensional and representational attention when we introduce
Experiment 2.
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the stages of processing involved in
categorization. Points at which attentional mechanisms might operate are
drawn as dashed boxes (see the text for details). Perceptual processes
provide raw inputs along a number of stimulus dimensions. Dimensional
attention then weights the input dimensions. When multiple category
representations are available, representational attention is used to select a
suitable category representation. The selected representation is then acti-
vated by the weighted dimensional input, usually on the basis of similarity.
A category decision is then made on the basis of the activation pattern,
resulting in a response.
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replication of Shepard et al.’s (1961) study, Lewandowsky (2011)
examined the dimensional attention-WMC link using structural
equation modeling (SEM). The behavioral data were very clear:
The classic ordering of the six problem types was reproduced, and
at the level of individual participants, a model with a mechanism
for selective attention (ALCOVE) fit the data better than a model
without (the configural cue model; Gluck & Bower, 1988). SEM
was then used to examine whether individual variation in perfor-
mance could be captured by any of ALCOVE’s parameters. A
single latent variable was sufficient to account for the variation of
parameters across all six problem types. Interestingly, the single
parameter that loaded onto this latent variable (with estimates for
each of the problem types constituting separate manifest variables)
reflected the rates at which direct stimulus-response associations
were learned by the model. ALCOVE’s attention learning param-
eter, by contrast, played virtually no role in explaining individual
differences, despite the fact that the observed speed of learning
across all problems was strongly related to WMC. This result runs
counter to the expectation of a straightforward relationship be-
tween attention in category learning and WMC. Why did learning
of dimensional attention fail to correlate with WMC?
We consider two possibilities in this article. First, it could be the
case that the Shepard problems are simply not sensitive enough to
detect variation in people’s ability to allocate dimensional atten-
tion: Only the Type I and II problems require deployment of
selective dimensional attention; the remaining four problems re-
quire attention to all three stimulus dimensions. Given that people
typically begin learning the Shepard problems in a diffuse atten-
tional state (Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a), it follows that the dimen-
sional attention learning demands across the suite of problems may
have been minimal, thus obscuring any genuine relationship with
WMC. On this account, a task that yields large and behaviorally
unambiguous dimensional attention effects may fare better at
revealing the link between dimensional attention and WMC. To
this end, our first study used two association learning tasks that are
widely thought to involve attentional learning: namely, blocking
and highlighting (e.g., Kamin, 1968; Kruschke, 2009).2 Second, it
could be that the Shepard problems, and others commonly exam-
ined in the context of dimensional attention (e.g., the so-called 5–4
problem introduced by Medin & Schaffer, 1978, and discussed in
detail by Rehder & Hoffman, 2005b, and Smith & Minda, 2000),
do not sufficiently engage executive attention and thus WMC.
Although dimensional attention seems to share many features with
executive attention, there is an alternative account on which the
two may actually be unrelated. Whereas dimensional attention
operates over features of the stimulus, executive attention is usu-
ally construed as operating over abstract cognitive representations
such as task goals (Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane et al., 2007). By
implication, if controlling access to cognitive representations is
central to executive attention as conceived by WM theoreticians, it
is not dimensional, but representational attention in categorization
that might be expected to relate closely to WMC. For example,
Erickson (2008) aligned executive attention with the gating mech-
anism of the ATRIUM model of category learning (Erickson &
Kruschke, 1998). In ATRIUM, representational attention is con-
trolled by a gating mechanism, which determines whether a rule-
based or exemplar-based category representation drives respond-
ing on a given trial. We discuss the implications of this view in
detail when we introduce Experiment 2. For now, we suggest that
executive attention may not contribute to the learning of a single
distribution of dimensional attention but may come into play when
coordination of multiple subsets of knowledge, which map onto
different category representations, is required. Because perfor-
mance on the Shepard problems is readily explained in terms of
distributions of dimensional attention over a single category rep-
resentation, it follows that those problems may not have tapped
executive attention. To examine this possibility, our second study
used a knowledge restructuring task that required repeated changes
in the way multiple category representations were coordinated
during the task.
To foreshadow our principal results, we adduce support for the
second alternative. That is, we fail to find any relationship between
WMC and dimensional attention, as assessed by the magnitudes of
blocking and highlighting effects. However, we uncover a signif-
icant relationship between WMC and the ability to change the way
different category representations are coordinated during a task.
Attention and Associative Learning: Blocking and
Highlighting
Since the discovery of associative blocking by Kamin (1968,
1969), there has been mounting evidence that attention plays a
central role in associative learning, and many contemporary mod-
els now include mechanisms for selective attention (Kalish, 2001;
Kalish & Kruschke, 2000; Kruschke, 1996a, 2001b; Le Pelley,
2004; Mackintosh, 1975). In a typical blocking paradigm (sum-
marized in Table 1), participants initially learn to associate some
cue, A, with some outcome, X. Throughout this article, associative
relationships are written using the notation, Cue 3 Outcome;
hence A3 X in Table 1. To ensure that A and X are distinguished
from other cues and outcomes, F3 Y trials are interleaved among
the A 3 X trials during early learning. After these initial associ-
ations are learned, a new learning phase begins that involves two
novel cue compounds presented with equal frequency, A.B 3 X,
and C.D 3 Y. In the late training phase, A still predicts outcome
X, as it did in the early learning phase; the only difference is that
A has been paired with a redundant cue, B. Note also that cues B,
C, and D have all been paired with their respective outcomes with
equal frequency. If simple co-occurrence determines associative
learning, it follows that the B3 X association should be as strong
as those between C 3 Y and D 3 Y. This prediction is assessed
on final test trials that present the ambiguous compounds B.C
3 ? and B.D3 ?, requiring participants to predict an unknown
outcome. A very robust finding (e.g., Kruschke & Blair, 2000;
Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005; Le Pelley, Beesley, &
Suret, 2007; Shanks, 1985) is that people strongly prefer outcome
Y over outcome X; the implication is that the associations between
C and Y and D and Y are stronger than the association between B
and X.
2 Although “attention” in these kinds of tasks can be decomposed into
dimensional attention on the one hand and cue- or feature-based attention
on the other (e.g., Johansen, Fouquet, & Shanks, 2010; Kalish, 2001), we
couch our discussion of blocking and highlighting effects in terms of
dimensional attention. It is noteworthy though that when stimuli are
comprised of cues that can be present or absent (as in Experiment 1, along
with most investigations of blocking and highlighting), stimulus dimen-
sions become indistinguishable from stimulus features.
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Taken at face value, the blocking effect appears to show that
very little has been learned about cue B. However, a dimensional
attention account holds that people do learn something about cue
B—they learn to ignore it. Although blocking per se does not
necessitate an explanation based on attention—the principle of
error-driven learning, as formulated in the classic model of Re-
scorla and Wagner (1972), suffices to produce blocking—the
further consequences of blocking do.
To test the dimensional attention account of blocking, Kruschke
and Blair (2000) elicited robust blocking effects using the proce-
dure just described. In a subsequent third training phase, the
blocked cue (B) was associated with a novel to-be-learned out-
come (e.g., Z). If blocking were due to learned inattention, subse-
quent learning about a blocked cue should proceed at a slower rate
compared to a control cue. By contrast, a purely error-driven
account predicts equivalent learning rates due to the error signal
introduced by the novel outcome. Kruschke and Blair’s results
were consistent with the dimensional attention account; the result
has since been replicated several times (Kruschke, 2005b; Le
Pelley et al., 2007). Further direct empirical support for the di-
mensional attention account of blocking was also adduced by
Kruschke et al. (2005), who showed that gaze duration to blocked
cues was reduced relative to non-blocked cues (see also Beesley &
Le Pelley, 2011). These results clearly show that learned inatten-
tion is a major driving factor behind blocking, thus providing
conceptual linkage with the executive attention said to underlie
suppression of irrelevant information in working memory.
Another effect in associative learning, closely related to block-
ing, is attentional highlighting (Kruschke, 1996a, 2003, 2005b,
2009; Kruschke et al., 2005; see also Gluck & Bower, 1988;
Johansen, Fouquet, & Shanks, 2010; Kalish, 2001; Kalish &
Kruschke, 2000; Medin & Edelson, 1988). Whereas in blocking,
dimensional attention is directed away from a novel cue, highlight-
ing involves directing dimensional attention toward a novel cue. In
a typical highlighting design (also summarized in Table 1), par-
ticipants are trained on a single association involving two cues and
an outcome, I.pE3 E, in an early training phase. In a later training
phase, a new association is introduced, I.pL 3 L. Note that the
associations are symmetrical in that each outcome is associated
with a single perfect predictor, cues pE and pL, and shares a
common imperfect predictor, I. If people learn the symmetry and
exhibit statistically normative behavior, cues pE and pL should be
equally predictive of outcomes E and L, respectively, whereas cue
I should be regarded as non-predictive. In a subsequent test phase,
people are presented with two critical stimuli, I 3 ?, and the
ambiguous compound, pE.pL 3 ?. Interestingly, people show
strong and conflicting choice outcome preferences for these stim-
uli. For I 3 ?, people exhibit a strong preference for outcome E.
Conversely, for pE.pL 3 ?, people prefer outcome L. The effect
illustrates a marked asymmetry in people’s learning: Cue I is more
strongly associated with outcome E, whereas the association be-
tween pL and L is stronger than the association between pE and E.
A normatively irrelevant predictor (I) is deemed relevant, whereas
one perfect predictor (pL) is apparently judged “more perfect” than
another one (pE).3
Kruschke (2009) provided an attentionally mediated order of learn-
ing account of highlighting, which postulates that highlighting occurs
because both cues I and pE form associations with outcome E in the
early learning phase. When the cue compound I.pL is introduced in
later training, the pre-existing association between I and the erroneous
outcome E introduces prediction error. The fastest way to eliminate
this error is to shift dimensional attention away from cue I and onto pL
whenever the compound I.pL is presented. The rapid attention shift
serves to protect previous learning about the association between cue
I and outcome E while accelerating learning about the relationship
between pL and L.
The consequences of attentional highlighting can be assayed in
the same way as for blocking. Kruschke (2005b) showed that
subsequent learning about a previously highlighted cue was easier
(i.e., more accurate) than a non-highlighted control cue (cf.
Kruschke, 1996b; Kruschke & Blair, 2000). Kruschke et al. (2005)
confirmed the attentional locus of the highlighting effect, showing
increased gaze duration to highlighted cues relative to non-
highlighted cues.
In sum, there is much evidence to suggest that both blocking and
highlighting are bona fide attentional effects in associative learn-
ing. We examine the relationship between blocking, highlighting,
and WMC in Experiment 1.
Experiment 1: Blocking and Highlighting
A relationship between WMC and blocking and highlighting
effects would be consistent with the idea that WMC and blocking
and/or highlighting engage a common form of attention. Failure to
find any relationship would imply that blocking and highlighting
do not rely on the same form of attention that is implicated in
WMC.
Method
The experiment was spread over three 1-hr sessions scheduled at
participants’ convenience. Participants completed both the block-
ing and highlighting tasks in a single experimental session. The
order of the blocking and highlighting tasks was determined by
random allocation to one of eight “modular sequences” described
in detail later. The other two experimental sessions involved an
unrelated categorization experiment. WMC was measured using
the battery of four tasks presented by Lewandowsky, Oberauer,
Yang, and Ecker (2010). WMC tasks were spread across the three
3 The highlighting effect was first reported by Medin and Edelson (1988)
as an inverse base rate effect, so-called because their study involved only
a single training phase with the base rates of stimuli analogous to I.pE 3
E and I.pL 3 L differing according to a 3:1 ratio. It is now known that
unequal base rates are not required to produce the effect (Kruschke, 2009),
and hence the more appropriate term highlighting is used to refer to the
phenomenon.
Table 1
Typical Blocking and Highlighting Designs
Phase Blocking Highlighting
Early A 3 X F 3 Y I.pE 3 E
Late A.B 3 X C.D 3 Y I.pE 3 E I.pL 3 L
Test B.D 3 ? (Y) B.C 3 ? (Y) pE.pL 3 ? (L)
A.C 3 ? (X) A.D 3 ? (X) I 3 ? (E)
Note. Typical responses to test items are shown in parentheses.
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sessions. All experiments were controlled by a Matlab program
designed using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli,
1997).
Participants. A total of 140 people from The University of
Western Australia community participated in the three-session
experiment either in exchange for course credit or remuneration at
a rate of AUD$10 per hour. The sample was sufficiently large to
allow SEM.
Modular sequences. Following Lewandowsky (2011), we
sought to strike a balance between maximizing experimental con-
trol via counterbalancing on the one hand and reducing “method”
variance on the other. We created eight unique “modular se-
quences” to which participants were randomly assigned. Partici-
pants within a given modular sequence received the same stimulus
sequence; that is, stimulus presentation order and the mapping
between stimulus features and abstract experimental design for the
blocking and highlighting tasks were fixed across participants
within a given modular sequence. Participants in different modular
sequences encountered different training sequences and different
stimulus feature mappings. The order in which participants com-
pleted the blocking and highlighting tasks was counterbalanced
across modular sequences such that each task was first in four of
the eight sequences.
WMC. Because working memory is a multifaceted construct
(Oberauer et al., 2000, 2003), it is almost certain that a measure-
ment based on a single task will overlook important aspects of the
construct of interest. For example, Lewandowsky et al. (2010)
analyzed a number of tasks intended to measure WMC and found
variation in performance on these tasks to be a composite of
variation due to a general WMC factor plus variation due to
task-specific factors. To avoid the pitfalls of contaminating WMC
measurement with task-specific variance, we used a heterogeneous
WMC test battery in both experiments (Lewandowsky et al.,
2010).
The four tasks in this battery addressed two content domains of
WMC (verbal/numerical vs. spatial) in addition to two functional
aspects of WMC (information storage in the context of online
processing and integration of relational information). The tasks
included operation span (OS; Turner & Engle, 1989), sentence
span (SS; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), spatial short term mem-
ory (SSTM; Oberauer, 1993), and memory updating (MU; Ober-
auer et al., 2000; Salthouse, Babcock, & Shaw, 1991).
Performance on the various working memory tasks have been
found to load onto a single latent variable, thus providing a robust
and reliable estimate of WMC. These tasks are described in detail
in Lewandowsky et al. (2010), and we therefore do not restate
those details here.
Blocking and highlighting tasks. The blocking and high-
lighting tasks were based on those used by Kruschke et al. (2005).
In all cases, two copies of the abstract designs detailed in Table 1
were implemented in the experiment. For example, where A3 X
appears in Table 1, two versions, A1 3 X1 and A2 3 X2 were
implemented in the actual experiment (see Tables 2 and 3 for
details). Both tasks required determining the identities of “agents”
sending a number of “coded messages.” The coded messages were
constructed from a set of stimulus words that were randomly
sampled from the same pool of 20 candidate words used by
Kruschke et al. Candidate words were five-letter nouns with fa-
miliarity, imagability, and concreteness ratings above 500, as
recorded in the MRC Psycholinguistics Database (http://
www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa mrc.htm). Each modular
sequence involved a different random sample of stimulus words.
Within each modular sequence, there was no overlap between the
set of stimulus words used for the blocking task and the stimulus
set for the highlighting task. The mapping between implemented
and abstract response alternatives (i.e., the “senders” of the coded
messages) was invariant across participants but differed between
blocking and highlighting tasks.
Table 2
Details of the Blocking Design Used in Experiment 1
Phase Trial items Duration
Early A1._ 3 X1 _.A1 3 X1 F1._ 3 Y1 _.F1 3 Y1 10  8 trial blocks
A2._ 3 X2 _.A2 3 X2 F2._ 3 Y2 _.F2 3 Y2
Late A1.B1 3 X1 B1.A1 3 X1 C1.D1 3 Y1 D1.C1 3 Y1 10  8 trial blocks
A2.B2 3 X2 B2.A2 3 X2 C2.D2 3 Y2 D2.C2 3 Y2
Test Training stimuli shown at test (presented twice each)
A1.B1 3 X1 B1.A1 3 X1 C1.D1 3 Y1 D1.C1 3 Y1
A2.B2 3 X2 B2.A2 3 X2 C2.D2 3 Y2 D2.C2 3 Y2
Test stimuli: Class B.(C/D) 3 ?
D1.B1 3 ? B1.D1 3 ? D2.B2 3 ? B2.D2 3 ?
D2.B1 3 ? B1.D2 3 ? D1.B2 3 ? B2.D1 3 ? 48 trials
C1.B1 3 ? B1.C1 3 ? C2.B2 3 ? B2.C2 3 ?
C2.B1 3 ? B1.C2 3 ? C1.B2 3 ? B2.C1 3 ?
Test stimuli: Class A.(C/D) 3 ?
A1.C1 3 ? C1.A1 3 ? A2.C2 3 ? C2.A2 3 ?
A1.C2 3 ? C2.A1 3 ? A2.C1 3 ? C1.A2 3 ?
A1.D1 3 ? D1.A1 3 ? A2.D2 3 ? D2.A2 3 ?
A1.D2 3 ? D2.A1 3 ? A2.D1 3 ? D1.A2 3 ?
Note. The ordering of cues in the table reflects their left–right positioning on the screen in the experiment. The “_” symbol denotes a cue position that
was unoccupied. Stimuli unique to the test phase are divided into two classes: B.(C/D) 3 ? and A.(C/D) 3 ? (see the text for details).
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Procedure. Participants completed all tasks in a sound-
attenuated testing booth. The basic trial structure for the blocking
and highlighting tasks was very similar. An example blocking trial
is presented schematically in Figure 2. Participants indicated their
response via mouse click in one of the response boxes below the
fixation point. During training, corrective feedback was provided
directly following a response in the location previously occupied
by the following response prompt: “CORRECT! The message was
sent by . . .” or “WRONG! The message was sent by . . . .” For test
stimuli, which were never paired with any outcome, the message
“Response recorded” was presented instead. Feedback remained
visible until participants terminated the trial by clicking a button
labeled “Next” that appeared in the center of the response alter-
natives. Appearance of the feedback and the “Next” button was
separated by a mandatory 1-s study period. A 500-ms blank
interval separated trials.
The training regime for the blocking task involved an early
phase followed by a late phase. Each phase involved 80 training
trials, divided into 10 eight-trial blocks. Each training block
comprised a random permutation of the relevant subset of
stimuli detailed in Table 2. The training phases were followed
by a test period that involved all of the stimuli included during
the late training phase (which were presented twice each) in
addition to a set of previously unencountered test stimuli (pre-
sented once each). Test stimuli were presented in a random
order determined by the particular modular sequence. Perfor-
mance on the training stimuli presented during the test phase
was used to assess extent of learning. The test stimuli were
divided into two classes. B.(C/D) stimuli paired the blocked
cue B with one of the control cues, C or D. Responses to these
stimuli indicate whether the C3 Y and D3 Y associations are
stronger than the B3 X associations and, thus, test directly for
blocking. By contrast, A.(C/D) stimuli pair the blocking cue A
with the control cues. Responses to these items reflect the
strength of the A 3 X association relative to the C 3 Y and
D 3 Y associations.
The training regime for the highlighting task followed the
canonical design proposed by Kruschke (2009), which equates
base rates for all training stimuli and involved three training
phases (see Table 3 for details). In total, there were 168 training
trials (excluding the training stimuli interleaved among test
stimuli, which were used to assess learning of the training set).
As with the blocking task, the order of trials was randomly
permuted within each block. Test stimuli were ordered by
randomly permuting the entire stimulus set. The two classes of
Table 3
Details of the Highlighting Design Used in Experiment 1
Phase Trial items Duration
Early I1.pE1 3 E1 pE1.I1 3 E1 3  8 trial blocks
I2.pE2 3 E2 pE2.I2 3 E2
Late (1) I.pE shown 3 times each: I.pL shown 1 time each: 3  16 trial blocks
I1.pE1 3 E1 pE1.I1 3 E1 I1.pL1 3 L1 pL1.I1 3 L1
I2.pE2 3 E2 pE2.I2 3 E2 I2.pL2 3 L2 pL2.I2 3 L2
Late(2) I.pE shown 1 time each: I.pL shown 3 times each: 6  16 trial blocks
I1.pE1 3 E1 pE1.I1 3 E1 I1.pL1 3 L1 pL1.I1 3 L1
I2.pE2 3 E2 pE2.I2 3 E2 I2.pL2 3 L2 pL2.I2 3 L2
Test Training stimuli shown at test (shown 1 time each)
I1.pE1 3 E1 pE1.I1 3 E1 I1.pL1 3 L1 pL1.I1 3 L1
I2.pE2 3 E2 pE2.I2 3 E2 I2.pL2 3 L2 pL2.I2 3 L2 24 trials
Test stimuli shown 2 times each
Class I._ 3 ? Class pE.pL 3 ?
I1._ 3 ? _.I1 3 ? pE1.pL1 3 ? pL1.pE1 3 ?
I2._ 3 ? _.I2 3 ? pE2.pL2 3 ? pL2.pE2 3 ?
Note. The ordering of cues in the table reflects their left–right positioning on the screen in the experiment. The “_” symbol denotes a cue position that
was unoccupied. Stimuli unique to the test phase are divided into two classes: I._ 3 ? and pE.pL 3 ? (see the text for details).
Figure 2. Schematic of an example blocking trial. Stimulus words are
presented toward the top of a computer screen. The four response options
are presented toward the bottom of the screen. Participants indicated their
response via mouse click.
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test stimuli were designed to assess the association strengths
between the I, pE, and pL cues and their trained outcomes. I._
test stimuli involved I cues presented in isolation to determine
whether they were differentially associated with outcome E.
The pE.pL test stimuli paired the two perfect predictors of
outcomes E and L to determine whether the pL3 L association
dominated the pE 3 E association by virtue of attentional
highlighting of the pL cue.
Results
Data screening. To be included in the final analysis, a
participant needed to have (a) completed all WMC tests, (b)
performed better than 70% on the processing components of the
two complex span tasks (OS and SS), and (c) performed signifi-
cantly better than chance on the training stimuli that were inter-
leaved with test items in both the blocking and highlighting tasks.
For the blocking task, the chance cutoff was eight correct re-
sponses out of the 16 relevant trials (given p  .25 and binomial
assumptions). For the highlighting task, correct responses on at
least six of the eight training trials were needed to exceed chance.
Only three participants failed to meet the performance criteria on
either the blocking or highlighting tasks. An additional 16 partic-
ipants were removed from the analysis because of either failing to
complete all test sessions (nine participants) or performing worse
than 70% on at least one of the processing components in the span
tasks. In total, data from 121 participants remained for analysis.
Working memory battery. Working memory performance
was scored using a partial-credit scheme (cf. Conway et al., 2005).
For instance, a participant who correctly remembered five out of
six letters in a complex-span trial would score 5/6 on that trial,
with the person’s total score representing the mean of these partial
scores across trials. Descriptive statistics for the WMC battery are
shown in Table 4; they are consonant with those obtained during
previous applications of the battery (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2011;
Ecker, Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Chee, 2010; Lewandowsky,
2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2010; Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell, &
Kalish, 2011).
Blocking and highlighting effects. Our analysis of the block-
ing and highlighting data follows that of Kruschke et al. (2005).
Overall accuracy on the 16 training stimuli presented at test was at
ceiling (M  0.97), indicating robust learning of the training set.
There was no obvious difference in learning between the A.B and
C.D training stimuli (both Ms  0.97).
We next examined choice preferences for the two classes of test
stimuli. For the B.(C/D) class stimuli, which paired the blocked
cue B with control cues C and D, participants chose the response
option associated with the control cue (Response Y) 59% of the
time. The response associated with the blocked cue (Response X)
was chosen only 35% of the time. The remaining 6% of responses
were distributed across the other two response options. We
counted the number of times each participant gave the relevant Y
response minus the number of times that participant gave the
relevant X response, divided by the number of B.(C/D) trials (i.e.,
16). This yielded an index of choice preference for the B.(C/D)
class of stimuli, which we denote DmBc, for D minus B for choice.
The mean DmBc value was 24%, which was significantly greater
than 0, t(120)  7.24, p  .001, r2  .30, indicating a robust
blocking effect.
To confirm that the effect could not be attributed to a bias to
choose the control response when faced with conflicting cues, we
examined choice preferences for Class A.(C/D) test items, which
paired cue A with the two control cues. Responding reflected a
differential preference for the outcome associated with cue A
(Response X), which was selected 68% of the time. The response
associated with the relevant control cue (Response Y) was selected
on only 30% of trials. The remaining 2% of responses were
distributed across the other two response options. We computed
analogous component measures of choice preference by counting,
for each participant, the number of X responses minus the number
of Y responses, divided by the number of A.(C/D) trials (i.e., 16).
This choice preference index for A.(C/D) stimuli is denoted AmCc,
for A minus C for choice. The mean AmCc was 37%, which was
significantly greater than 0, t(120)  11.42, p  .001, r2  .52,
indicating that the blocking effect was not due to a general pref-
erence for the control outcome.
We analyzed the highlighting data in a similar manner. To
confirm that the training set was learned, we examined response
accuracy to the I.pE and I.pL training stimuli presented during the
test phase. Overall accuracy on these eight training stimuli was at
ceiling (M  0.95). Comparably high levels of learning were
achieved for the I.pE and I.pL training stimuli (Ms  0.97 and
0.94, respectively).
We next examined choice preferences for the two classes of test
stimuli. For the pE.pL test stimuli, which paired the perfect pre-
dictors for outcomes E and L, participants chose the response
option associated with the pL cue (Response L) 64% of the time.
Table 4
Performance on the Working Memory Tasks in Experiment 1
Measure MU OS OSpt SS SSpt SSTM
M 0.59 0.71 0.91 0.68 0.91 0.86
SD 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.06
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Minimum 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Kurtosis 2.26 3.14 28.87 3.78 4.76 3.38
Skewness 0.07 0.60 3.97 0.82 1.18 0.48
SEM weights 1.00 0.56 0.55 0.44
Note. MU  memory updating; OS  operation span; SS  sentence span; pt  processing tasks; SSTM 
spatial short term memory; SEM weights  standardized regression weights (also known as loadings) for the
four tasks in the working memory capacity measurement model.
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The response associated with the early trained cue pE (Response
E) was chosen only 33% of the time. The remaining 3% of
responses were distributed across the other two response options.
As with the blocking results, we counted, for each participant, the
number of relevant L responses minus the number of relevant E
responses, divided by the total number of pE.pL trials (i.e., 8). We
refer to this choice index as pLmpEc, for pL minus pE for choice.
The mean pLmpEc was 31%, which was significantly greater than
0, t(120)  7.46, p  .001, r2  .32, reflecting a robust highlight-
ing effect.
To determine whether the imperfect cue I became differentially
associated with outcome E, we examined responses to the I._ class
of test stimuli. Outcome E was chosen 66% of the time, compared
to outcome L, which was chosen only 30% of the time. The
remaining 4% of responses were distributed across the remaining
two response options. A choice index, Ic, was computed by count-
ing, for each participant, the number of E responses minus the
number of L responses, divided by the total number of I._ trials
(i.e., 8). The mean Ic value was 36%, which was significantly
greater than 0, t(120)  9.09, p  .001, r2  .41, indicating that
cue I was differentially associated with outcome E.
Covariation of effects. Following Kruschke et al. (2005), we
obtained general indices of the overall blocking and highlighting
effects by summing the subcomponent choice measures. Thus, the
blocking effect was indexed by DmBc  AmCc, and highlighting
was indexed by pLmpEc  Ic. Before investigating the patterns of
correlations between blocking and highlighting, in addition to the
correlations among their component measures, we corrected the
empirical correlations for attenuation due to measurement error
(Spearman, 1904). The correction for attenuation compensates for
the fact that empirical correlations are systematically biased down-
ward when data are collected in the presence of measurement error
and can result in corrected correlations greater than unity (see
Charles, 2005, for discussion). The corrected correlation is ob-
tained by dividing the empirical correlation by the geometric mean
of the reliabilities of the variables being correlated,
rxyc
rxy
rxxryy. (1)
The need to correct for attenuation is greater with lower test
reliabilities (Fan, 2003). We computed Cronbach’s alphas both for
the blocking and highlighting tasks as a whole and separately for
the subclasses of test stimuli. For example, in the blocking task, the
response on each trial was coded as either consistent with blocking
(1, observed response was associated with the control cue),
inconsistent with blocking (1, observed response was associated
with the blocked cue), or neither (0, observed response was not
associated with either cue presented on that trial). Table 5 sum-
marizes the reliabilities used to correct the raw empirical correla-
tions.
We report both raw (written as remp) and corrected correlations
(written as rcor) below; p values are included for the raw correla-
tions. For the corrected correlations, we report 95% confidence
intervals based on methods described by Charles (2005). We first
examined the correlation between the two component measures of
blocking, which were positively correlated, remp  .49, p  .001.
Correcting for attenuation yielded rcor  .73, 95% CI [0.43, 1.25].
For the component highlighting measures, the results were less
clear-cut. The raw empirical correlation was marginally signifi-
cant, remp  .16, p  .08, and although correcting for attenuation
increased the magnitude of the correlation, the 95% confidence
interval narrowly included 0, rcor  .31, 95% CI [0.04, 0.73].
With the exception of the fact that the correlation between the
component highlighting measures was only marginal, we repli-
cated the general pattern of correlations reported by Kruschke et al.
(2005).
We next examined whether the magnitudes of the overall block-
ing and highlighting effects covaried within individuals. Curi-
ously, we found no evidence of any correlation between the
magnitude of an individual’s blocking and highlighting effects,
remp  .04, p  .66, even after correcting for attenuation, rcor 
.06, 95% CI [0.22, 0.36]. This diverges from the results of
Kruschke et al. (2005), who found a significant positive correlation
of .38. To confirm that our failure to find any correlation between
blocking and highlighting was not due to “impurities” introduced
by the AmCc and Ic measures, we correlated the component
performance indices that map most directly onto the individual
blocking and highlighting effects (viz., by correlating DmBc with
pLmpEc). This correlation was also nonsignificant, remp  .10,
p  .29, even after correcting for attenuation, rcor  .17, 95% CI
[0.15, 0.52]. Given that our sample size was roughly three times
larger than that used by Kruschke et al., we are reluctant to ascribe
the absence of a correlation to a lack of power in our study.
We investigated the lack of correlation between blocking and
highlighting effects via computational modeling with EXIT
(Kruschke, 2001b). We summarize the details of the modeling
here; full details are reported in Appendix A. Our hypothesis was
that the absence of a blocking–highlighting correlation was due to
differential involvement of dimensional attention across the two
tasks; namely, that dimensional attention was necessary to produce
highlighting but not blocking. We adopted a nested model ap-
proach, whereby we fit EXIT to the combined data from the
blocking and highlighting tasks. That is, the model was forced to
fit both data sets with a common set of parameter values. We then
relaxed this constraint and allowed the model’s attention parameter
values to differ between the tasks. If the more flexible model
produces a significant improvement in fit to data, accounting also
for the increased complexity of the more flexible model, it is
concluded that the additional flexibility is warranted by the data.
Table 5
Cronbach’s Alphas for Overall Indices of Blocking and Highlighting, and Stimulus Subsets
Comprising Their Component Measures
Measure Blocking B.(C/D) A.(C/D) Highlighting pE.pL I._
Cronbach’s  .76 .64 .64 .57 .52 .53
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We found that EXIT could only account for the data quantita-
tively when its attention parameters differed across the blocking
and highlighting tasks. Inspection of the parameter values revealed
that the model utilized both attentional and associative mecha-
nisms for fitting the highlighting data. For fitting the blocking data,
the model effectively shut off its attention shifting and attention
learning mechanisms and instead relied only on associative learn-
ing (see Appendix A for full details). The modeling is consistent
with previous theoretical claims that dimensional attention need
not be invoked to explain blocking per se (Rescorla & Wagner,
1972). It also confirms our hypothesis that the absence of a
blocking–highlighting correlation was due to differences in the
attentional demands of the tasks.
Although our conclusions about performance in the blocking
task run counter to those of Kruschke et al. (2005), it is well known
that dimensional attention is not necessarily required to explain
blocking per se. Our results merely suggest that identification of
the determinants of whether a given example of blocking arises
from associative or attentional factors awaits future research.
These issues do not impinge on our primary focus of how indi-
vidual differences in WMC relate to variation in blocking and
highlighting performance. We now report SEM that addresses the
key individual differences issues of interest.
Structural Equation Modeling.
Measurement models. The measurement model for WMC
included a single latent variable, which we label WMC. Consistent
with previous applications of the WMC battery (Lewandowsky et
al., 2010), the fit of the model was improved by freely estimating
the correlation between the error terms associated with the OS and
SS tasks. The benefit of estimating the correlation between these
error terms derives from the fact that the two tasks are structurally
quite similar. OS examines memory in the context of a numerical
processing task, whereas SS examines memory in the context of a
verbal processing task. The resulting model provided an excellent
fit, 2(2)  0.0, comparative fit index (CFI)  1.0, root-mean-
square error of approximation (RMSEA)  .0, 90% CI [0.0, 0.0],
standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR)  .0054. The
loadings of the four manifest variables are shown in the bottom
row of Table 4.4
We explored several measurement models for the blocking and
highlighting tasks. The first model involved six manifest variables,
four of which tracked learning performance—namely, the (log
transformed) total number of errors in the early and late phases of
the blocking and highlighting tasks. (For the highlighting task, we
pooled the two late phases into one; see Tables 2 and 3.) The
remaining two manifest variables tracked the attentional aspects of
the tasks—namely, the overall measures of blocking and highlight-
ing. Means and variances of the manifest variables are reported in
Table 6.
Because of the lack of correlation between the blocking and
highlighting measures, we were unable to investigate a two-factor
model that considered learning separately from dimensional atten-
tion. Instead, we investigated the loadings of each manifest vari-
able onto a single latent variable. All four learning indicators
loaded significantly onto the latent variable, in contrast to the
attentional manifest variables (i.e., blocking and highlighting),
both of which failed to load.5 Accordingly, we label the latent
variable in this model Errors, and we interpret the single-factor in
terms of learning, not attention. The fit of the single-factor model
was very good, 2(9)  7.7, CFI  1.0, RMSEA  .0, 90% CI
[0.0, 0.092], SRMR  .0455.
Structural model. The two measurement models were com-
bined into a final structural model, shown in Figure 3. (Complete
correlation matrices for both experiments are provided in Appen-
dix B.) The structural model shows how learning accuracy in both
tasks (captured by the latent variable, Errors) relates to the WMC
latent variable measured by the WMC battery. The model fit very
well with the weights involving blocking and highlighting set to 0,
2(35)  30.3, CFI  1.0, RMSEA  .0, 90% CI [0.0, 0.053],
SRMR  .0554.
The significant negative correlation (r  –.44) between the
latent variables WMC and Errors indicates that higher WMC was
associated with fewer errors during learning in both the blocking
and highlighting tasks. However, the lack of a measurement model
for a common attention construct prevents us from drawing con-
clusions about the relationship between a putative dimensional
attention construct and WMC. To address this issue, we used the
WMC measurement model to examine the relationship between
the WMC latent variable and each attention measure in isolation.
For this analysis, tantamount to investigating regression coeffi-
cients relating the behavioral indices of dimensional attention (i.e.,
measures of the highlighting effect) to the WMC latent variable, we
took the measurement model for WMC, fixed all manifest variable
loadings, then added the highlighting index as well as its compo-
nent indices, Ic and pLmpEc, as additional indicators of the WMC
latent variable. None of the highlighting measures loaded signifi-
cantly onto the WMC latent variable (s for highlighting, Ic, and
pLmpEc  –.06, –.07, –.02, respectively, ps 	 .43). Thus, we
conclude that there is no evidence in our data of a relationship
between dimensional attention and WMC.
An apparent complication in interpreting the SEM results from
Experiment 1 arises from the fact that Lewandowsky (2011) found
association learning in ALCOVE to correlate with WMC. That is,
in his study, the association-learning parameter in ALCOVE in-
creased with people’s WMC when the model was fit to the data
from individual participants. Given that our blocking effect was
4 For the model to be estimable, the residual variance for MU had to be
fixed at 0. This proved unnecessary for the structural model, and we are
therefore not overly concerned about this constraint.
5 We also investigated models that included the “pure” measures of
blocking and highlighting as manifest variables (i.e., DmBc and pLmpEc).
These component measures, like the other measures we examined in the
main text, failed to load onto the latent variable.
Table 6
Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis for
Manifest Variables From the Blocking and Highlighting Tasks
Variable M SD Skewness Kurtosis
Blocking early errors 1.26 0.71 0.32 0.63
Blocking late errors 0.79 0.69 0.51 0.37
Highlighting early errors 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.40
Highlighting middle and late errors 1.29 0.82 0.32 0.001
Blocking effect 0.62 0.63 0.34 0.79
Highlighting effect 0.67 0.68 0.21 0.48
Note. All error measures were log transformed.
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arguably associative in nature—as revealed by modeling with
EXIT—one might have expected blocking, but not highlighting, to
load onto the latent variable in our structural equation model. Upon
further investigation, this lack of loading turned out to reflect the
fact that the conventional measure of blocking did not adequately
reflect the associative history between cues and outcomes. We
report the results of this extended analysis in Appendix C, noting
that once associative history is accounted for, blocking perfor-
mance loads onto the Errors latent variable in the expected man-
ner.
To summarize the SEM results, our findings are completely
consonant with related precedent (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2011;
Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2011). All manifesta-
tions of association learning are related to WMC, whereas there is
no obvious link between dimensional attention and WMC.
Implications
The SEM converges on a clear conclusion: Dimensional atten-
tion and WMC are distinct theoretical constructs. Individual dif-
ferences in learning of both tasks in Experiment 1 were charac-
terized by a single latent variable that was significantly correlated
with WMC. By contrast, we failed to find any relationship between
blocking and highlighting, the latter of which was confirmed to be
mediated by dimensional attention (see Appendix A), and WMC.
Both aspects of our results mesh well with the results of Le-
wandowsky (2011), who found minimal attentional involvement in
the modeling of individual differences in learning of the Shepard
problems.
The results of Experiment 1 are compatible with two competing
conclusions: One possibility is that executive attention as defined
in the working memory arena is entirely distinct from attention in
category learning (viz., dimensional attention). Another possibility
is that executive attention is involved in category learning but is
related instead to representational attention, which is implicated in
more complex categorization tasks involving the coordination of
multiple category representations. We investigate this possibility
in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: Knowledge Restructuring
Whereas Experiment 1 investigated the link between WMC and
dimensional attention, Experiment 2 focuses on a possible rela-
tionship between WMC and representational attention (Erickson,
2008; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998, 2002b). In categorization,
representational attention is invoked in situations where different
subsets of stimuli are classified on the basis of different represen-
tational formats; for example, some stimuli may be classified
according to a rule, whereas an exemplar-based representation
might handle a different subset of stimuli.
The distinction between dimensional attention on the one hand
and representational attention on the other is illustrated schemat-
ically in Figure 4. Each panel depicts a scheme for relating
stimulus inputs to category outputs. In the top panel, dimensional
attention affects the pattern of exemplar activation by selectively
enhancing inputs along dimensions D1 and D2—increased dimen-
sional attention weights are drawn in boldface in the figure. Cat-
egory responses are determined by the stimulus-response mapping,
Figure 3. Structural model for Experiment 1. Standardized estimates and all statistically significant paths are
presented in bold. MU  memory updating; OS  operation span; SS  sentence span; SSTM  spatial short
term memory; WMC  working memory capacity.
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which in the top panel is a matrix of exemplar-to-category asso-
ciations. The bottom panel illustrates a model with both dimen-
sional and representational attention. The effects of dimensional
attention are the same as those in the top panel. Representational
attention gates the associations between individual exemplar nodes
and the various representational formats available to the model:
Exemplars 1 and 2 gate access to representation R1, whereas
Exemplars 3 and 4 gate access to representation R2. Category
responses are determined by the output of the selected represen-
tation.
In the figure, the exemplar-to-category association matrix in the
dimensional-attention model (top panel) is assumed to be identical
to R1 in the representational attention model (bottom panel).
Models with only dimensional attention can be viewed as special
cases of representational-attention models: For example, the model
shown in the bottom panel can be reduced to the model in the top
panel if the distribution of representational attention is such that
each exemplar gates access to a common representation (e.g., if all
exemplar nodes selectively accessed R1). Thus, models with rep-
resentational attention can be seen as supersets of models that only
comprise dimensional attention.
One category learning model that implements representational
attention is ATRIUM, which minimally learns to associate stimuli
with either a rule or exemplar representation, one or the other of
which determines classification (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998). The
pattern of activation across ATRIUM’s exemplar nodes is deter-
mined by the model’s allocation of dimensional attention. Exem-
plar activations determine, via a representational-attention “gate,”
whether a rule representation or exemplar-based representation is
accessed and subsequently used to generate a category response.
Representational attention is therefore inextricably related to the
coordination of multiple category representations, which individ-
ually constitute subsets of partial category knowledge. Within
ATRIUM, dimensional and representational attention are distinct,
but related, constructs. They are distinct because dimensional
attention is involved in similarity computations and the weighting
of stimulus input, whereas representational attention is involved in
the selection of a category representation. They are related in that
shifts of representational attention can be induced by lower level
shifts of dimensional attention (Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011).
The notion of representational attention, and the attendant co-
ordination of partial knowledge, is readily explored in so-called
knowledge restructuring tasks, which involve switching between a
number of candidate response strategies (e.g., Kalish, Le-
wandowsky, & Davies, 2005; Lewandowsky, Kalish, & Griffiths,
2000; Little, Lewandowsky, & Heit, 2006; Sewell & Le-
wandowsky, 2011). For example, the study by Sewell and Le-
wandowsky (2011) involved the coordinated application of two
partial categorization rules to different subsets of stimuli. Their
category structure, which was also used in our Experiment 2, is
shown in Figure 5 along with two example stimuli.
The stimuli were rectangles that varied along two dimensions:
the height of the rectangle and the position of a vertically oriented
bar along the base of the stimulus. The rectangle width was fixed.
Thus, each point in Figure 5 corresponds to a different configura-
tion of rectangle height and bar position. The example stimulus
shown on the left side of the figure was sampled from the bottom
left region of the category space (short rectangle with bar position
on left), whereas the example stimulus on the right side of the
figure was sampled from the top right region of the space (tall
rectangle with bar position on right).
Experiment 2 was broken down into different phases comprising
training and test blocks. On each trial during training blocks,
participants were required to categorize a single stimulus from
among the set of training stimuli (represented as filled diamonds in
the figure); responses were immediately followed by corrective
feedback. On each trial during test blocks, participants categorized
a single stimulus drawn from the set of transfer stimuli (repre-
sented as open squares in the figure); no feedback was provided
during any test block.
Several features of the category structure make it diagnostic of
the use of representational attention. Note that there are two
separate clusters of training stimuli, one in the bottom left corner
of the category space, the other in the top right. Each cluster
comprises 20 Category A stimuli and 20 Category B stimuli, which
are separated from one another by a partial category boundary
(along one of the stimulus dimensions). With respect to the left
training cluster, Category A stimuli are situated below the partial
boundary, whereas Category B stimuli are situated above the
boundary. With respect to the right training cluster, Category A
stimuli are placed to the left of the boundary, whereas Category B
stimuli are placed to the right of the boundary. Note that the two
partial boundaries cannot be integrated in a coherent manner—
neither partial boundary can be extended in a way that permits
Figure 4. Illustration of the distinction between dimensional and repre-
sentational attention. Attentional effects are shown as boldfaced associative
connections. The top panel shows a case involving only dimensional
attention. Connections from input dimensions D1 and D2 to the exemplar
nodes (triangles) are selectively enhanced by being weighted more heavily
than D3. The bottom panel shows a case involving both dimensional and
representational attention. The pattern of connections from inputs to ex-
emplars from the top panel is reproduced in the left-hand side of the bottom
panel. The effects of representational attention are shown via the enhanced
associations from individual exemplars to the various representational
mappings. Exemplars 1 and 2 gate access to representation R1, whereas
Exemplars 3 and 4 gate access to representation R2. Each representation
summarizes a stimulus-response mapping (e.g., an associative matrix, such
as the one shown in the shaded rectangle in the top panel).
454 SEWELL AND LEWANDOWSKY
accurate classification of the training cluster straddling the other
partial boundary. Thus, the category structure is ideally suited to
observe the coordination and selective application of multiple
partial rules.
In addition to the two stimulus dimensions depicted along the x-
and y-axes in Figure 5, a third binary context dimension (instan-
tiated by stimulus color) was systematically mapped onto the two
training clusters. For example, all training stimuli in the cluster
straddling the left partial boundary may have been presented in
red, whereas stimuli from the right training cluster may have been
presented in green. The inclusion of this third context dimension
enables at least two ways in which the partial categorization rules
could be coordinated and applied to the broader set of transfer
stimuli. Under a knowledge-partitioning (KP) strategy, context is
used to determine whether the left or right partial boundary is
applicable. By contrast, under a context-insensitive (CI) strategy,
the position of the stimulus along the x-axis (i.e., whether a
stimulus is on the left- or right-hand side of the space) determines
which rule to apply.6 Both strategies can support perfect perfor-
mance during training (stimuli represented by filled diamonds in
the figure), but they lead to qualitatively different patterns of
performance on the transfer test (open squares) when the entire set
of transfer stimuli are presented once in each context. Figure 6
illustrates idealized versions of these two response profiles.
Sewell and Lewandowsky (2011) instructed participants to use
either the KP or CI strategy at the outset. In each case, people were
6 Technically, there are multiple CI strategies. Rule selection could be
determined by position along the y-axis or through some combination of x
and y positions. We describe the strategy in relation to the x-axis because
we experimentally controlled strategy use via direct instructions.
Figure 5. Category space used in Experiment 2. The abscissa describes the position of a vertically oriented bar
along the base of the stimulus (relative to the center of the stimulus). The ordinate denotes rectangle height.
Filled diamonds denote training stimuli; open squares denote transfer stimuli. Solid lines are the partial rule
boundaries. Dashed lines divide the space into four diagnostic quadrants, which are numbered in the figure. Two
example stimuli are shown underneath the category space.
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told that for each stimulus, only a single dimension was required
for categorization but that the relevant dimension depended on the
stimulus itself. Thus, participants were told that bar position de-
termined category membership for some stimuli, but rectangle
height determined category membership for others. People in-
structed to use the KP strategy were told that context (i.e., stimulus
color) reliably indicated whether height or bar position was diag-
nostic. By contrast, people instructed to use the CI strategy were
told that bar position (i.e., whether the bar was on the left- or
right-hand side of the stimulus) indicated which dimension was
diagnostic. Thus, people were told to initially use one stimulus
dimension to gate subsequent use of another stimulus dimension to
perform categorization. Participants completed an initial training
phase, followed by a transfer test, performance on which was
diagnostic of strategy use. Participants were then instructed to use
the contrasting strategy—which had never been mentioned be-
fore—before completing another transfer test. People who were
initially told to gate rule use on the basis of context were informed
that bar position should be used to determine the relevant stimulus
dimension, and vice-versa.
In a final testing phase, instructions were yet again reversed, and
people reverted to their original strategy. Thus, participants per-
formed the task either under KP–CI–KP instructions or in a CI–
KP–CI order. Several aspects of the results are noteworthy. People
were able to rapidly and repeatedly recoordinate their partial
knowledge in response to instructions: Whenever they received the
KP instructions, their transfer profiles resembled those in the
bottom panels of Figure 6, and whenever they received CI instruc-
tions, their profiles resembled the top panels. Remarkably, people
could shift between strategies without requiring any training on the
novel strategy—thus, learning under CI instructions enabled peo-
ple to switch to the KP strategy, and vice versa, simply in response
to a written hint and without feedback-driven learning. We used
the same instructional regime in Experiment 2.
Sewell and Lewandowsky (2011) showed that this repeated,
fluid, and near-instantaneous knowledge restructuring was incom-
patible with a slow associative or attentional learning process, as
instantiated in ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992). Instead, the results
were quantitatively modeled by a version of ATRIUM that was
equipped with multiple rule representations (cf. Yang & Le-
wandowsky, 2004). In ATRIUM, knowledge restructuring was
modeled by a shift in dimensional attention, which in turn elicited
a shift in representational attention. Specifically, when the context
dimension had a high dimensional attention weight, gating of the
rule representations was based on context, thereby implementing
the KP strategy; when the x dimension had a high dimensional
attention weight, rule selection was determined by the stimulus
position along the x-axis, irrespective of context, thus implement-
ing the CI strategy. Sewell and Lewandowsky further showed that
the content of the rules underpinning the KP and CI strategies was
virtually identical: Associations within the rule modules were
highly correlated regardless of which response strategy was used at
Figure 6. Ideal response profiles associated with the context-insensitive (CI; top row) and knowledge-
partitioning (KP; bottom row) strategies. Performance in the left and right contexts is shown in the left and right
columns of panels, respectively.
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transfer. The fact that common rule-based knowledge was used to
instantiate both strategies provides converging evidence that the
observed restructuring was driven solely by a shift in representa-
tional attention.
The controlled and volitional aspect of the knowledge restruc-
turing reported by Sewell and Lewandowsky (2011) distinguishes
it from Experiment 1 and the category learning tasks investigated
by Lewandowsky and colleagues (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2011;
Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2011): Switching strat-
egies did not involve a rapid shift of dimensional attention pro-
voked by the stimulus (as in highlighting), and there was not a
performance-related error signal to direct gradual learning of di-
mensional attention (as in blocking and typical supervised catego-
rization). Whereas the attentional factors involved in blocking
(when it involves attention), highlighting, and supervised catego-
rization tasks can be viewed as “bottom-up,” knowledge restruc-
turing and recoordination can occur in the absence of changes in
the stimulus and are thus better characterized as involving “top-
down” attentional control.
We suggest that control over the coordination of multiple rule
representations relates closely to notions of executive attention as
discussed in the working memory literature. Application of one
cognitive strategy over another that affords equal performance
requires a high degree of top-down control involving a combina-
tion of selectively maintaining one set of task goals associated with
one strategy while selectively suppressing a competing set of goals
associated with another strategy. Theoretically, this maps well
onto contemporary notions of executive attention (e.g., Engle,
2002; Engle & Kane, 2004; Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2001,
2007). We thus expected that the extent to which people can
restructure their knowledge and switch categorization strategies
should correlate with measures of WMC.
Method
Experiment 2 was similar to the first study, with the primary
difference being the nature of the categorization task. In the first
categorization session, we initially instructed participants to learn
either the KP or CI strategy by telling them that either context or
bar position indicated whether the stimulus could be categorized
on the basis of rectangle height or bar position. The category
structure was identical regardless of instruction condition.
People then completed a training phase, which was followed by
a transfer test. Afterwards, participants were instructed to switch
response strategies, and they had to categorize the entire set of
transfer stimuli without having practiced the new strategy. That is,
people who were initially told to select rules on the basis of
context, were now told to select rules on the basis of bar position,
and vice-versa.
In the second categorization session, participants had an oppor-
tunity to practice the new strategy, followed by another transfer
test. Upon completion of the transfer test, participants were again
suddenly instructed to switch response strategies before complet-
ing a fourth and final transfer test (i.e., in the second test following
Categorization Session 2, they were instructed to reinstate their
original response strategy from the first session).
Participants and WMC measurement. A total of 106 peo-
ple from The University of Western Australia community partic-
ipated either in exchange for course credit or remuneration at a rate
of AUD$10 per hour. WMC was assessed in the same way as in
Experiment 1 in the first of three experimental sessions.7
Participants were randomly allocated to one of eight modular
sequences that were analogous to those from Experiment 1. Each
sequence involved a unique pre-loaded trial order and stimulus
assignment. The mapping between color and context was counter-
balanced across modular sequences. Half of the modular sequences
required participants to learn the KP strategy first.
Procedure. The categorization part of the study involved two
sessions carried out on separate days. Each session involved a
training period followed by two successive transfer tests. For
clarity, we refer to the transfer tests from Categorization Session 1
as Tests 1 and 2, and those from Categorization Session 2 as Tests
3 and 4. The task involved categorization of rectangle stimuli that
varied along two dimensions: the height of the rectangle (y dimen-
sion in Figure 5) and the horizontal offset of a bar located along the
base of the rectangle (x dimension in Figure 5). Depending on
which modular sequence a participant was assigned to, they were
instructed to learn either the KP (KP-first condition) or CI (CI-first
condition) strategy; 53 people were assigned to each condition. For
the KP-first condition, participants were informed that context
determined whether the x or y dimension was relevant for a given
stimulus. For the CI-first condition, participants were told that the
position of the bar offset (on either the left- or right-hand side of
the stimulus) determined whether the x or y dimension was rele-
vant for categorizing a particular stimulus. No information about
the positioning of the partial rule boundaries along each dimension
was given (i.e., there was no mention of specific “cutoff” values).
Training involved six 40-trial blocks; each training stimulus was
presented once per block, with presentation order determined by
the random permutation for the particular modular sequence. For
Categorization Session 1 only, we allowed for an early exit from
training if a participant made 40 consecutive correct responses.
The earliest possible exit was after completion of four complete
training blocks (160 trials). Because this is a fairly stringent
criterion, it seemed unlikely to pose any problems in interpreting
subsequent test performance (Tharp & Pickering, 2009). For the
purposes of assessing training accuracy, it was assumed that par-
ticipants who met the early exit criterion achieved perfect perfor-
mance for the remainder of the training period. There was no early
exit from Categorization Session 2 training, which was only two
blocks in duration (80 trials).
Results
Data screening. We applied the same retention thresholds as
in the first study. Three participants (two from the CI-first condi-
tion, one from the KP-first condition) failed to perform better than
chance in the categorization task (i.e., assuming a binomial re-
sponse model, greater than 65% in the final training block of the
first session). A further two participants scored less than 70% on
at least one of the WMC processing tasks. A further participant
7 The category learning data from the first 48 participants were analyzed
and modeled in the aggregate and reported elsewhere (Sewell & Le-
wandowsky, 2011). That initial report did not include any WMC results or
individual-differences analysis and also did not include the data of the
remaining 58 participants.
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was removed due to incomplete WMC data, yielding a final
sample of 100 participants for analysis.
Working memory battery. Table 7 shows summary statis-
tics for the WMC battery. Not surprisingly, the data mirror the
results of the first experiment.
Categorization analysis.
Training performance. Training performance in Categoriza-
tion Session 1 was very similar in both the KP-first and CI-first
conditions. Performance was highly accurate overall, with 32
people from the CI-first condition and 32 people from the KP-first
condition achieving the early exit criterion. For the remaining
participants in each condition, performance on the final Categori-
zation Session 1 training block was highly accurate (M  89% for
both the CI-first and KP-first conditions). Training performance in
the final Categorization Session 2 training block was comparably
high (Ms  95% and 96% for the CI-first and KP-first conditions,
respectively). Thus, we conclude that the training sets were learned
extremely well—and to an equal extent—in both conditions and
under both response strategies.
Strategy differences in test performance. To confirm the
effectiveness of the initial instructions, we compared performance
of the KP-first and CI-first conditions on Transfer Test 1. The
averaged response profiles for each condition are presented in
Figure 7. Each square in the figure shows the probability of
generating an “A” response, P(A), for that stimulus. It is clear that
the CI-first condition relied on the CI strategy, whereas the KP-
first condition used a context-sensitive KP strategy.
To compare performance of the two conditions statistically, we
first divided the space into four diagnostic regions by aggregating
across transfer stimuli in the four quadrants of the space (i.e., the
regions defined by the dashed lines and labeled numerically in
Figure 5) for each context. We then averaged the aggregated
response data across participants. A 2 (Condition) 2 (Context)
4 (Quadrant) between-within analysis of variance (ANOVA) re-
turned a significant three-way interaction, F(3, 294)  92.89,
MSE  0.01, p  .001, 
p2  .29, reflecting the differential
sensitivity to context between conditions. Follow-up Condition 
Quadrant between-within ANOVAs on performance within each
context revealed condition-specific patterns of responding across
Quadrants; significant interactions were observed in the left con-
text, F(3, 294)  47.03, MSE  0.02, p  .001, 
p2  .32, and the
right context, F(3, 294) 89.05, MSE 0.03, p .001, 
p2  .48.
The pattern of results demonstrates that the hints were effective at
determining the manifest categorization strategy in the first trans-
fer test.
Performance on all other transfer tests corresponded very
closely to the two patterns shown in Figure 7. To efficiently
capture changes in strategy use across all four transfer tests, we
introduce a context-sensitivity measure that tracks usage of the KP
and CI strategies. This measure was computed by taking the
average item-wise difference in P(A) for stimuli that would be
categorized differently between contexts if the KP strategy were
perfectly applied (see Figure 6). Responses for the four stimuli in
the bottom right corner of the space were reverse coded for this
analysis, as categorization of these stimuli changes in the opposite
manner to all other relevant stimuli as a function of context under
the KP strategy. Thus, context sensitivity ranges from –1 to 1,
with positive values reflecting response patterns consistent with
application of the KP strategy, and values near 0 reflecting usage
of the CI strategy. Accordingly, Test 1 performance in the KP-first
condition was associated with a high context sensitivity score
(M  0.87), whereas the CI-first condition was associated with a
low score (M  0.10). Figure 8 plots context sensitivity as a
function of transfer test for both conditions. It is clear that the hints
had immediate and opposite effects on performance across the two
conditions.
Also of note is the apparent asymmetry of KP between the two
groups. Participants in the CI-first condition, who were initially
trained to ignore context, appeared to exhibit weaker KP than
participants in the KP-first condition—compare the context sen-
sitivity scores of the CI-first condition in Tests 2 and 3 to those of
the KP-first group in Tests 1 and 4. By contrast, there was no
discernible difference between the groups when implementing the
CI strategy. This asymmetry implies a selective difficulty with
shifting from the CI to the KP strategy that is absent in the reverse
direction. We interpret this difference in terms of dimensional
relevance shifts: It is known that it is easier to attend to a previ-
ously relevant stimulus dimension than it is to attend to a previ-
ously ignored dimension (Hoffman & Rehder, 2010; Kruschke,
1996b). We first note that under both strategies, the rectangle
height and bar position dimensions were necessary for categoriza-
tion. The difference between conditions was whether the context
dimension was to be used in addition to the other stimulus dimen-
sions. For people in the KP-first condition, all stimulus dimensions
were relevant during initial training, and so restructuring to the CI
strategy involved using a previously relevant stimulus dimension
Table 7
Performance on the Working Memory Tasks in Experiment 2
Measure MU OS OSpt SS SSpt SSTM
M 0.62 0.74 0.93 0.71 0.92 0.87
SD 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.04
Maximum 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Minimum 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Kurtosis 2.38 2.81 6.48 4.83 4.64 2.50
Skewness 0.31 0.30 1.31 0.88 1.25 0.46
SEM weights 0.71 0.54 0.56 0.56
Note. MU  memory updating; OS  operation span; SS  sentence span; pt  processing tasks; SSTM 
spatial short term memory; SEM weights  standardized regression weights (also known as loadings) for the
four tasks in the working memory capacity measurement model.
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(bar position) for a new purpose (rule selection). By contrast,
people in the CI-first condition were effectively instructed to
ignore the context dimension during initial training (i.e., context
was not involved in either rule selection or categorization). Thus,
restructuring to the KP strategy involved having to use a previ-
ously irrelevant stimulus dimension for the purposes of rule selec-
tion.
Sewell and Lewandowsky’s (2011) modeling of a similar pat-
tern of results with ATRIUM provides convergent support for the
relevance shift interpretation of the asymmetrical knowledge re-
structuring in Figure 8. Sewell and Lewandowsky modeled knowl-
edge restructuring by implementing changes in ATRIUM’s distri-
bution of dimensional attention, which in turn caused shifts of
representational attention. There was an asymmetry in changes in
the attentional loading on the context dimension that mirrored the
context sensitivity data. For example, between Tests 1 and 2, the
attention weight on context dropped from .74 to 0 for the KP-first
condition, but it increased only from .04 to .65 for the CI-first
condition. Thus, the ability of the CI-first condition to attend to
the context dimension appeared weaker than the ability of the
KP-first condition to ignore it in Test 2. It is perhaps puzzling that
participants’ additional training between Tests 1 and 2 did not
further increase context sensitivity in the CI-first condition. Given
the difficulty in attending to a previously irrelevant stimulus di-
mension, we suggest that the absence of an error signal during
training may be the reason the CI-first condition was unable to
achieve the same level of context sensitivity as the KP-first group
when implementing the KP strategy—both the KP and CI strate-
gies would result in perfect training performance.
We now focus on two key statistical tests of knowledge restruc-
turing—namely, changes in context sensitivity between Tests 1
and 2 (to test for initial knowledge restructuring) and context-
sensitivity changes between Tests 3 and 4 (to test for strategy
recovery). In the KP-first condition, there was a clear drop in
context sensitivity between Tests 1 and 2 (M  –0.88), reflecting
knowledge restructuring from the KP to the CI strategy, t(49) 
–30.05, p  .001, r2  .95. By contrast, in the CI-first condition,
context sensitivity increased between Tests 1 and 2 (M  0.55),
reflecting restructuring from the CI to the KP strategy, t(49) 
9.82, p  .001, r2  .66. The patterns of restructuring between
Tests 3 and 4 were consistent with recovery of people’s original
response strategy. In the KP-first condition, context sensitivity
between Tests 3 and 4 increased (M  0.74), as people restruc-
tured from the CI strategy in Test 3 to the KP strategy in Test 4,
t(49)  12.80, p  .001, r2  .77. In the CI-first condition, there
was a reduction in context sensitivity (M  –0.62), as people
reverted back to the CI strategy, and away from KP, t(49) 
–10.57, p  .001, r2  .70. To determine whether the knowledge
restructuring between Tests 3 and 4 involved recovery of people’s
original response strategy, we correlated responses to the diagnos-
tic stimuli (i.e., those that were sensitive to knowledge restructur-
ing) from Tests 1 and 4 for the KP-first and CI-first conditions. In
both cases, the correlations were very high—r  .99 (KP-first),
r  .98 (CI-first)—implying strategy recovery.
Figure 7. Item-wise P(A) in each context in the first transfer test for the knowledge-partitioning (KP)-first and
context-insensitive (CI)-first conditions in Experiment 2. Darker levels of shading correspond to higher P(A).
Shading varies in steps of .1.
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Structural Equation Modeling of Experiment 2. We inves-
tigated a number of structural equation models to explore the
relationship between WMC and knowledge restructuring in the
categorization task. Distributions of manifest variable data were
either approximately Gaussian or were log transformed to achieve
normality, as discussed below.
Measurement models. As in Experiment 1, we developed
separate measurement models for the WMC battery and the cate-
gorization task, which we later combined into a structural model.
The measurement model for WMC again included a single latent
variable (WMC) and a freely estimated pairwise correlation be-
tween the error terms associated with the OS and SS tasks. The
model fit extremely well, 2(1)  0.8, CFI  1.0, RMSEA  .0,
90% CI [0.0, 0.255], SRMR  .0132. The loadings of the four
manifest variables are shown in Table 7.
The measurement model for the categorization task involved
five manifest variables. Three of the variables described training
performance using the log transformed total number of errors: For
Categorization Session 1, the two manifest variables described
performance in Blocks 1–3 and 4–6, respectively. For Categori-
zation Session 2, a single variable described performance in
Blocks 7 and 8. The remaining two manifest variables corre-
sponded to the absolute changes in the context-sensitivity measure
within each testing session. Changes in context sensitivity reveal
the extent of transition between the KP and CI strategies and, thus,
reflect the extent of knowledge restructuring within each session.
Means and variances of the manifest variables are reported in
Table 8.
We initially considered a two-factor measurement model, in
which we associated one latent variable with the indices of learn-
ing, and the second latent variable with the representational atten-
tion measures (viz., the extent of knowledge restructuring in each
session). On the basis of modification indices, a correlation be-
tween the error terms associated with training performance in the
first and second halves of Categorization Session 1 was freely
estimated. The two-factor model fit the data very well, 2(3) 
3.42, CFI  .997, RMSEA  .038, 90% CI [0.0, 0.178], SRMR 
.0275, with all manifest variables loading in the expected way onto
their latent variables. Constraining the correlation between the
Error and Knowledge Restructuring latent variables to unity re-
sulted in a significant decrement in fit, 2(1)  4.08, p  .04,
justifying retention of a second factor in the model.
Structural model. The measurement models for the WMC
battery and the categorization task were combined to yield a
three-factor structural model. The structural model fit the data
well, 2(22)  18.14, p  .70, CFI  1.0, RMSEA  .0, 90% CI
[0.0, 0.066], SRMR  .0458, and is presented in Figure 9. The
correlations among the three latent variables in Figure 9 are of the
most interest. First, there is a strong negative correlation between
the Errors latent variable and the Knowledge Restructuring latent
variable (r  –.81), showing that more extensive restructuring was
Figure 8. Context sensitivity across all transfer tests in Experiment 2 for the knowledge-partitioning (KP)-first
and context-insensitive (CI)-first conditions.
Table 8
Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis for
Manifest Variables From the Knowledge Restructuring Task
Variable M SD Skewness Kurtosis
Session 1 early errors 2.38 0.88 0.03 0.77
Session 1 late errors 1.03 1.12 0.92 0.21
Session 2 errors 1.36 0.80 0.29 0.04
Session 1 extent of restructuring 0.74 0.29 1.23 0.71
Session 2 extent of restructuring 0.73 0.32 1.25 0.45
Note. All error measures were log transformed.
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associated with more accurate learning. Second, WMC was nega-
tively correlated with Errors (r  –.43), showing that WMC was
related to fewer errors during learning. This relationship replicates
the one we found in Experiment 1 between WMC and learning and
it buttresses other work that has found a uniformly positive link
between WMC and category learning (cf. Craig & Lewandowsky,
2011; Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2011). Finally,
there was a significant positive correlation between WMC and
Knowledge Restructuring (r  .36), showing that higher WMC
was related to a greater extent of restructuring. The latter result
directly implicates an association between WMC and representa-
tional attention, showing that the two constructs share unique
variance that is not accounted for by overall learning.
Individual variation in learning performance and the extent of
knowledge restructuring were both shown to load onto latent
variables associated with WMC. The pattern of results is consistent
with the idea that the form of attention that is responsible for the
coordination (and recoordination) of multiple categorization rules
is related to the executive attention concept often invoked in
working-memory research. By the same token, this form of atten-
tion differs from other manifestations of learned attention in
category and association learning. We suggest that the knowledge
restructuring in Experiment 2 was reliant on executive attention,
whereas the highlighting effect from Experiment 1 was reliant on
learned dimensional attention—only the former, but not the latter,
shares unique variance with WMC.
Implications
The key empirical contribution of Experiment 2 is the discovery
that the extent of knowledge restructuring shares unique variance
with WMC. The overall relationship is one of higher WMC being
associated with greater knowledge restructuring. That is, the ex-
tent to which people were able to successfully change categoriza-
tion strategies was positively related to their WMC. Because it is
known that transitioning between the KP and CI strategies requires
recoordination of partial category representations (Sewell & Le-
wandowsky, 2011), the correlation between the latent variables is
plausibly attributable to an executive attention mechanism that
enacts top-down selection of partial knowledge.
A clear implication for category learning is that the construct of
“attention” must be nuanced to distinguish between feature-based
or dimensional attention on the one hand and executive attention
on the other. Although dimensional attention played a central role
in performance in both experiments, only Experiment 2 required
executive control over the coordination of multiple category rep-
resentations.
General Discussion
We examined the relationship between WMC and two forms of
attention in category/associative learning. Experiment 1 explored
the relationship between WMC and dimensional attention using
associative blocking and highlighting paradigms, which are widely
thought to engage attentional factors (Kruschke et al., 2005). We
found no evidence of any relationship between WMC and the
magnitude of blocking and highlighting effects. Instead, we found
that WMC related to overall learning performance (cf. Craig &
Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al.,
2011). Experiment 2 used a knowledge restructuring task that
required representational attention to mediate changes in response
strategies. In this case, we found that WMC related to both
learning performance and the extent to which people could shift
between response strategies. Taken together, the results imply that
the relation between attention and WMC in categorization is
determined by the need to coordinate multiple elements of partial
knowledge (e.g., multiple categorization rules). In tasks that do not
require coordination of multiple representations, WMC would only
be expected to play a role in learning of stimulus-to-response
associations (e.g., Lewandowsky, 2011). However, when the task
requires coordination of multiple representations, people with
higher WMC would be more effective at selectively accessing
them, or alternatively, to be more effective at setting top-down
attentional control parameters that determine how representational
selection occurs on a trial-by-trial basis (e.g., as suggested by
Erickson, 2008). Our results speak to a number of theoretical
perspectives on attention, learning, and WMC. Before discussing
these implications, we take up some potential limitations of the
current studies.
Limitations
The principal limitation of the current experiments relates to the
between-subjects nature of the comparisons between dimensional
and representational attention. That is, different sets of people
participated in the two experiments. This precludes comparison of
Figure 9. Structural model for Experiment 2. Significant correlations
and factor loadings (all standardized estimates) are presented in bold.
MU  memory updating; OS  operation span; SS  sentence span;
SSTM  spatial short term memory; WMC  working memory capac-
ity; KR  knowledge restructuring.
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the two modes of attention using an individual-differences ap-
proach. Pragmatic constraints prevented testing of the same indi-
viduals in all tasks.
A second potentially problematic aspect of the current results
concerns the failure to observe a significant correlation between
the magnitudes of the blocking and highlighting effects in Exper-
iment 1. Our results stand in contrast to those of Kruschke et al.
(2005) despite the fact that the tasks in our first study were largely
identical to theirs.8 Notwithstanding the necessary reluctance to
accept a null result, our study appears unlikely to have been
underpowered, given that our sample size was roughly three times
that of Kruschke et al.—namely, 121 versus 33. On the basis of
modeling with EXIT (see Appendix A), we suggest that the ab-
sence of correlation likely reflects, at least in our study, differential
involvement of associative and attentional mechanisms in blocking
and highlighting. Theoretically, this result is in line with classical
models that are able to explain the blocking effect without recourse
to attention (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). However, considered
against the backdrop of more recent results that have shown
attentionally mediated consequences of blocking (Beesley & Le
Pelley, 2011; Kruschke, 2005b; Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Le Pelley
et al., 2007), our results are somewhat puzzling. For now, we have
good reason to accept that only highlighting involved attentional
processes in our Experiment 1. The circumstances that determine
whether a given example of blocking is attentional or associative
in nature remain to be seen; the identification of such circum-
stances is a worthy target for future research.
Attention, WMC, and Category Learning
In category learning, attention has traditionally played a rela-
tively circumscribed theoretical role, typically capturing the dif-
ferential relevance of stimulus features (Kruschke, 2005a). For the
most part, this is a parsimonious approach, as dimensional atten-
tion suffices to explain many category learning phenomena. More
recently though, researchers investigating more complex category
structures have shown that dimensional attention alone may not be
enough to fully explain category learning (Aha & Goldstone, 1992;
Denton, Kruschke, & Erickson, 2008; Erickson, 2008; Erickson &
Kruschke, 1998, 2002a; Lewandowsky, Roberts, & Yang, 2006;
Little & Lewandowsky, 2009; Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011;
Yang & Lewandowsky, 2003, 2004). In some cases, as in the
ATRIUM model with its modular architecture, an additional
“layer” of attention (i.e., representational attention) has been re-
quired to explain performance. The current study has further
reinforced the need to distinguish between dimensional and rep-
resentational (or executive) attention in category and associative
learning. Whereas shifts in dimensional attention suffice to capture
many aspects of learning that arise as a consequence of manipu-
lating the dimensional relevance structure (e.g., Kruschke, 1996b),
only shifts in representational attention are able to account for
abrupt strategy shifts such as those related to knowledge restruc-
turing (e.g., Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011).
It is noteworthy that the representational attention shifts in
Experiment 2 were controlled and volitional, in that participants
had to deliberately change the way in which they coordinated rule
use to comply with instructions. Although this is a distinctive
feature of the task we used, and a driver of knowledge restructur-
ing, there is nothing inherently volitional about shifting represen-
tational attention in ATRIUM, for example. We suggest that the
deliberate control over the distribution of representational attention
plays a particularly important role in relating knowledge restruc-
turing and WMC. The need to selectively engage one modularized
subset of knowledge at a time gels nicely with the fact that WMC
relates to the ability to resist proactive interference (Engle, 2002;
Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2001; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2001).
That people in our experiment were able to successfully reinstate
their original response strategy in Test 4 of the category learning
task is further suggestive of this protective function of executive
attention. The alignment of executive attention with WMC has
clear implications for perspectives on category learning that fore-
ground the role of working memory.
Recently, several category learning theorists have hypothesized
that working memory might be differentially involved in different
types of categorization tasks (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). These
authors have suggested that rule-based tasks—such as those we
used here—tax working memory, whereas other so-called
information-integration tasks do not (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; see
Newell, Dunn, & Kalish, 2011, for a contrasting perspective).
Information-integration tasks are not solvable by a verbalizable
rule and require the integration of two or more aspects of the
stimulus at a pre-decisional stage. In contrast to that expectation,
our relevant work to date has produced quite stable and reproduc-
ible results: Across six experiments involving over 800 partici-
pants in total, WMC has been found to be associated with overall
levels of learning, regardless of whether tasks place differential
demands on dimensional attention (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2011;
Lewandowsky, 2011) or are rule-based or require information-
integration (Lewandowsky et al., 2011). We attribute the stability
of our findings to our latent variable approach to measuring WMC,
which permits a more robust assessment of WMC that is free of
measurement error and avoids problems arising from the substan-
tial task-specific variance associated with individual working
memory tasks (Lewandowsky et al., 2010).
Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Processing
Our provisional alignment of executive and representational
attention emphasizes the contribution that controlled, top-down
processes make to category learning. The emphasis on volitional
processing is underscored by the fact that knowledge restructuring
was elicited by a deliberate shift of representational attention. In
complex categorization tasks such as those involving task parti-
tioning or knowledge restructuring, the controlled coordination of
different components of partial knowledge is critical. For example,
the knowledge restructuring observed in Experiment 2 required
systematic changes in the way rule representations were selec-
tively accessed over the course of the experiment. The final session
of Experiment 2 in particular required actively applying one re-
sponse strategy whilst passively maintaining the alternative strat-
8 One procedural factor that may have contributed to the discrepancy
was that we trained people for a fixed number of trials in Experiment 1. By
contrast, Kruschke et al. (2005) trained people to an accuracy criterion.
Although use of accuracy criteria to assess task mastery can be fraught with
problems (e.g., Tharp & Pickering, 2009), the fact that we were able to
reproduce blocking and highlighting effects at asymptotic levels of perfor-
mance allays these concerns.
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egy. The simultaneous selection and suppression of subsets of
strategic information bears close resemblance to notions of exec-
utive attention (e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane et al., 2007). The
fact that WMC was strongly associated with the extent of knowl-
edge restructuring is quite consistent with the idea of executive
attention playing a key role in recoordination in particular, and
knowledge restructuring more generally.
The link between representational attention and WMC is readily
contrasted with the absence of any relationship between WMC and
dimensional attention (e.g., Experiment 1 and Lewandowsky,
2011). The latter is suggestive of a contribution of stimulus-driven,
bottom-up processes in categorization tasks that do not require
coordination of knowledge or executive control. The idea that
highlighting and more elaborate blocking designs may involve
bottom-up factors is supported by the finding that manipulating the
salience of the blocked cue can greatly attenuate the blocking
effect (Denton & Kruschke, 2006). Similarly, Lamberts and Kent
(2007) argued that highlighting is unlikely to be mediated by
strategic, top-down factors such as explicit hypothesis testing
because the effect persists even under severe time pressure to
respond (e.g., within 300 and 500 ms). By a similar token, there is
much evidence to suggest that bottom-up attentional factors are
unrelated to WMC. Kane et al. (2001) examined the relationship
between working memory span and performance in prosaccade
and antisaccade tasks where people, respectively, had to orient
attention toward or away from a highly salient peripheral cue (e.g.,
Posner, 1980). Whereas the prosaccade task involved exogenous
(bottom-up) reflexive orienting, the antisaccade task involved en-
dogenous (top-down) controlled orienting. Only performance on
the antisaccade task was related to working memory span.
Alternative Views of Working Memory
Although we have interpreted our results within the framework
of an executive-attention view of working memory, and although
our results mesh well with that notion, we do not selectively
endorse this view over other theoretical approaches to working
memory. For example, Oberauer and colleagues (e.g., Oberauer,
Su¨, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007) have developed a tripartite ap-
proach to working memory that involves three concentric “layers”
of increasingly accessible and active information: The first layer
corresponds to the activated portion of long-term memory, the
second is known as a “direct-access region,” and the final, most
highly active layer is a single item that is in the “focus of atten-
tion.” WMC is thought to be associated with the size of the
direct-access region—that is, the number of items that are avail-
able for immediate processing.
A crucial property of the direct-access region is that it tem-
porarily binds together representations that are required for
cognitive operations. For example, item representations may be
bound to their temporal context, they may be bound to a spatial
location, and they may be transformed before being bound to a
new or different context (e.g., Ecker et al., 2010). The notion of
binding is particularly relevant in the present context because
long-term (category) learning is thought to involve transfer of
information from the direct-access region to long-term memory.
However, at present, the exact role of short term binding during
long-term learning is far from clear; Oberauer’s model is thus
best considered as a pointer toward future theoretical develop-
ment of a process model relating WMC to long-term category
learning. As a step in that direction, Lewandowsky (2011)
showed that WMC can map into additional “rehearsals” within
ALCOVE, suggesting that people with higher WMC are better
able to retain bound representations of stimuli in working
memory for successive strengthening of their long-term con-
nections with the response options. It remains for future re-
search to explore how the binding notion favored by Oberauer
and colleagues maps into the executive-attention notion re-
quired to explain the knowledge restructuring results of Exper-
iment 2.
Future Directions
Although this article has addressed a number of issues on the
emerging relationship between working memory and categoriza-
tion, our work has also opened up a number of theoretical ques-
tions that remain unanswered. We thus briefly offer suggestions
for future research. With regards to theories of learning and atten-
tion, our failure to find an attentional locus of the blocking effect
(see Appendix A for full details) can be contrasted with a variety
of findings that have found attentional consequences of blocking
(e.g., Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Kruschke, 2005b; Kruschke &
Blair, 2000). A key factor seems to be the overall complexity of
the blocking design. Studies that have found evidence for atten-
tional effects of blocking have usually used more complicated
designs that involve multiple testing phases and larger sets of
stimulus cues. Clearly, a more comprehensive understanding of the
factors that determine whether a blocking effect is attentionally
mediated is needed.
Turning to the relationship between WMC and categoriza-
tion, our study found evidence that WMC was related to cate-
gory learning in both experiments. In addition, WMC predicted
knowledge restructuring. The abrupt changes in performance in
our knowledge restructuring task relate closely to other tasks
that require set-shifting of various kinds. To date, the evidence
that set-shifting relates to WMC has been surprisingly weak.
Oberauer et al. (2003) found only weak relationships between
set-shifting ability and performance on a number of standard
working memory tasks (e.g., reading span). Similarly, Miyake,
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, and Howerter (2000) found only
weak relationships between set-shifting and OS performance. In
reconciling our results with those of Miyake et al. and Oberauer
et al., it is useful to refer to the distinction made by Cools, Ivry,
and D’Esposito (2006) between shifts that involve concrete
aspects of a task (e.g., responding on the basis of different
stimulus features on different trials) versus those that involve
abstract aspects of a task (e.g., responding on the basis of a
different rule from a previous trial). The former type of shift
involves a change in the stimulus to be responded to. That is, a
different stimulus will drive responding on different trials, but
the response rule might stay the same. The latter type of shift
involves applying different response rules to the same stimulus
at different times. The tasks used by Miyake et al. and Oberauer
et al. involved one or the other type of shift. By contrast, our
Experiment 2 required shifting between qualitatively different
ways of coordinating common categorization rules: Participants
had to shift between rule sets on a trial-by-trial basis (i.e.,
shifting between bar position and rectangle height rules), but
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they also had to shift between response strategies that involved
different stimulus features (i.e., using context or bar position to
select a rule). Resolution of the sorts of set-shifting that do and
do not relate to WMC awaits further research.
Another aspect of performance in our knowledge restructuring
task was the “gating” function played by different stimulus dimen-
sions under different categorization strategies. For example, the
KP strategy required people to categorize stimuli on the basis of
either the rectangle height or bar position dimensions depending
on the context dimension. Thus, certain stimulus dimensions were
not always directly relevant for categorization but were neverthe-
less useful in that they indicated other dimensions that were
directly relevant for categorization (cf. Blair, Watson, Walshe, &
Maj, 2009). Given that WMC was found to correlate with people’s
ability to change the dimension they used to gate rule use, it is
possible that WMC might only underpin categorization strategies
that involve such dimensional gating. However, Craig and Le-
wandowsky (2011) have explored strategy use in a number of
categorization tasks and found no relationship between WMC and
the categorization strategy people ultimately used (though catego-
rization accuracy was related to WMC, much as we report here,
regardless of which strategy people ultimately chose). Clarification
of how categorization strategy, coordination of representations,
and WMC interrelate is, in our view, a very worthy target for
future research.
Conclusions
Attention is a central but heterogeneous theoretical construct
in the areas of category learning and working memory. Despite
this apparent overlap, it has remained unclear whether con-
structs included under the rubric of attention generalize across
research domains. Recent studies investigating the relationship
between WMC and dimensional attention in categorization have
been unable to find a reliable link (e.g., Craig & Lewandowsky,
2011; Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2011), sug-
gesting differences between attentional constructs in category
learning and working memory theorizing. We have shown that
WMC is related to a different form of attention in categorization
that controls the coordination of multiple category representa-
tions. The latter property is only likely to manifest in more
complex categorization tasks that involve top-down selection of
partial knowledge.
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Appendix A
Fit of EXIT to Experiment 1 Data
We investigated the lack of correlation between blocking and
highlighting effects via computational modeling with EXIT
(Kruschke, 2001b). EXIT comprises an associative network that
connects cues to outcomes. The model also incorporates a complex
attentional mechanism that combines rapid attention shifts upon
presentation of a stimulus with long-term attentional learning
across trials. Our guiding question was why the blocking–
highlighting correlation was absent from our data. One possibility
is that our participants differentially relied on attention across the
two tasks. Kruschke, Kappenman, and Hetrick (2005) showed via
simulations with EXIT that the model could generate a positive
correlation between blocking and highlighting effects if its atten-
tional mechanisms were engaged in both tasks. However, their
Figure 2 reveals that within the model, dimensional attention was
only actually required to generate a highlighting effect. By con-
trast, blocking effects, although increased by attention, arise as a
more fundamental consequence of the model’s error-driven learn-
ing mechanism. This is theoretically unsurprising, as EXIT con-
tains a form of Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972) model as a special
case (Kruschke, 2001b), and that model suffices to produce block-
ing effects without dimensional attention, through error-driven
learning only. It follows that if our participants performed the
blocking task by exclusively relying on an associative learning
mechanism, but recruited both attentional and associative mecha-
nisms to perform the highlighting task, no correlation between
blocking and highlighting effects would be expected. We next
provide a brief overview of EXIT (Kruschke, 2001a, 2001b, pro-
vides complete details).
EXIT combines error-driven association learning with rapid
shifts of attention in a connectionist framework (cf. Kruschke &
Johansen, 1999). As discussed by Kruschke (2001b), when EXIT’s
attentional system is active, the model essentially includes Mack-
intosh’s (1975) model as a special case; similarly, when the atten-
tional system is inactive, EXIT reduces to a form of Rescorla and
Wagner’s (1972) model. On a given trial, the model responds on
the basis of learned associations between cues and response out-
comes. When corrective feedback is encountered, attention is
rapidly shifted away from cues that generated prediction error and
onto cues that lead to more accurate performance. The extent of
attention shifting is governed by a shift parameter, g. After an
attention shift has occurred, association weights are updated such
that learning of cue–outcome associations is focused on cues that
will maximize performance. The extent of association learning is
governed by a learning rate parameter, w. In addition to its rapid
attention shift mechanism, EXIT also incorporates an attention
learning mechanism that is tied to exemplar memory (cf.
Kruschke, 1992). The rationale is that different attentional distribu-
tions may be suitable for different stimulus configurations (e.g., Aha
& Goldstone, 1992). Thus, EXIT attempts to learn the post-shift
distribution of dimensional attention so it can be applied when the
stimulus is next encountered. The extent to which the model learns the
shifted distribution of dimensional attention is governed by an atten-
tion learning parameter, x, and the degree to which the shifted
attention distribution is tied exclusively to a given stimulus is deter-
mined by an exemplar specificity parameter, c.
To summarize, EXIT has three parameters that relate to dimen-
sional attention: The attention shift parameter, g, the attention
learning parameter, x, and the exemplar specificity parameter, c.
Cue-association learning is controlled by the w parameter. In
addition to these parameters, EXIT also includes a normalizing
constant used when computing attention weights, P, and a decision
parameter, , which converts response node activations to choice
probabilities.
To capture our assumptions that the role of attentional and
associative mechanisms may have differed between the blocking
and highlighting tasks, we allowed the three attention parameters
(g, x, and c) and the association learning parameter (w) to
assume task-specific values. We fit EXIT directly to the choice
probability data for each unique combination of cues presented at
test. Parameters were estimated by minimizing the (negative)
multinomial log likelihood statistic,
 ln L 
i1
20 
j1
4
dij lnpij).
The outer summation over i indexes the different cue combina-
tions presented at test. The inner summation over j indexes the four
response outcomes, and pij and dij correspond, respectively, to the
predicted proportion and observed frequency of outcome j re-
sponses for cue combination i. Best fitting parameters are pre-
sented in Table A1.
(Appendices continue)
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Table A1
Summary of Fit Statistics and Best Fitting Parameters of EXIT Fit to Data From Experiment 1
ln L RMSD cB cH  P g,B g,H x,B x,H w,B w,H
4,630.16 .0263 0 0.74 6.78 1.88 0 0.08 0 9.85 1.98 0.82
Note. Parameter subscripts identify best fitting values for the blocking (B) and highlighting (H) tasks. Parameters
correspond to exemplar specificity (c), response decisiveness (), attention capacity (P), attention shift rate (g), attention
learning rate (x), and association learning rate (w). See Kruschke (2001a, 2001b) for details. RMSD  root-mean-square
deviation.
EXIT provided an excellent fit to the combined blocking and
highlighting data, root-mean-square deviation (RMSD)  .0263.
The pattern of parameter values are readily interpreted: Attention
was clearly not required to fit the blocking data, whereas associ-
ation learning was; best fitting values for g,B, x,B, and cB were all
approximately 0, whereas w,B was 1.98. It is noteworthy that
under this set of parameter values, when EXIT’s attentional mech-
anisms are inactive, the model closely approximates Rescorla and
Wagner’s (1972) model (see Kruschke, 2001b, for discussion). To
fit the highlighting data, by contrast, EXIT required both atten-
tional and associative mechanisms to be active; g,H, x,H, cH, and
wH were all greater than 0. To confirm that this level of theoret-
ical flexibility was necessary to explain the data, we also fit a
restricted version of EXIT that did not allow attention and asso-
ciation parameters to vary across tasks. Although this model was
able to reproduce all qualitative patterns in the data, quantitatively
the restricted model fit significantly worse than the more general
model discussed above, ln L  4930.69, RMSD  .0878,
2(4)  –2 ln Lrestricted  2 ln Lgeneral  601.06, p  .05. Best
fitting parameters for the restricted model were as follows: c 
1.51,   4.84, P  1, g  .11, x  .0002, w  .64. Taken
together, the modeling shows that, at least in our experiment, the
blocking and highlighting effects arose from different mecha-
nisms; the former were associative, the latter, attentional.
Appendix B
Correlation Matrices for All Manifest Variables Used in the Structural Equation Models
in Both Experiments
Table B1
Correlations Between All WMC Tasks and Learning and Attentional Manifest Variables in Experiment 1
Variable
WMC tasks Learning Attention
MU OS SS SSTM B (early) B (late) H (early) H (midlate) B H
MU —
OS 0.56 —
SS 0.55 0.74 —
SSTM 0.44 0.24 0.23 —
B (early) 0.33 0.21 0.27 0.22 —
B (late) 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.42 —
H (early) 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.27 0.26 —
H (midlate) 0.31 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.39 0.33 0.05 —
B 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.13 —
H 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 —
Note. Working memory capacity (WMC) tasks are as in Table 4. MU  memory updating; OS  operation span; SS 
sentence span; SSTM  spatial short term memory; B  blocking; H  highlighting.
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Table B2
Correlations Between All WMC Tasks and Category Learning and KR Manifest Variables in Experiment 2
Variable
WMC tasks Category learning KR
MU OS SS SSTM S1 (early) S1 (late) S2 (all) KR1 KR2
MU —
OS 0.37 —
SS 0.41 0.66 —
SSTM 0.40 0.33 0.29 —
S1 (early) 0.28 0.23 0.14 0.25 —
S1 (late) 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.67 —
S2 (all) 0.22 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.52 —
KR1 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.33 0.36 0.38 —
KR2 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.06 0.35 0.32 0.53 0.48 —
Note. Working memory capacity (WMC) tasks are as in Table 7. KR  knowledge restructuring; MU  memory
updating; OS  operation span; SS  sentence span; SSTM  spatial short term memory; S1  Session 1 categorization
performance; S2  Session 2 categorization performance; KR1  extent of knowledge restructuring at end of Session 1;
KR2  extent of knowledge restructuring at end of Session 2.
Appendix C
Extended Analysis of Experiment 1
Lewandowsky (2011) recently reported a robust correlation
between working memory capacity (WMC) on the one hand and
associative learning rate on the other. In light of Lewandowsky’s
result, and given that our blocking effect was driven by associative
learning factors, the failure of blocking performance in Experiment
1 to load onto the Errors latent variable is striking. We suggest that
the reason blocking failed to load onto the latent variable is
because the conventional measure of blocking—used by both
Kruschke, Kappenman, and Hetrick (2005) and us—is insensitive
to important aspects of the associative history of the stimulus. We
show in this extended analysis that if the blocking measure is
modified to account for associative history, performance loads
onto the latent variable in the expected manner.
Recall that in Experiment 1, a pair of cues was presented on
each test trial in the blocking task. Each cue had an associative
history with a distinct outcome. For example, the cues comprising
the test compound B1.D1 were trained with outcomes X1 and Y1,
respectively. People had to respond to those items by choosing
among four possible outcomes: X1, X2, Y1, and Y2. Thus, there
were always two outcomes that were relevant to the cues (i.e.,
outcomes trained with the cues) and two outcomes that were
irrelevant to the cues (i.e., outcomes never trained with the cues).
Blocking was measured by examining the relative rates of gener-
ating relevant response outcomes. For example, for the test item
B1.D1, only outcomes X1 and Y1 were considered, whereas X2
and Y2 responses were effectively omitted from the calculation. If
excluding irrelevant responses obscures the associative nature of
the effect, a modified performance index that incorporates this
information would be expected to relate to WMC and, thus, load
on the Error latent variable.
We constructed alternative performance indices that were sim-
ilar to the AmCc (for A minus C for choice) and DmBc (for D
minus B for choice) measures reported in the main text. However,
instead of taking the difference between the number of relevant X
and Y responses, we summed the number of relevant responses
before dividing by the number of test items, thus yielding an index
of the number of relevant responses made to test stimuli. Because
the modified measures effectively assess the combined associative
strength of all stimulus cues in the display with their trained
outcomes relative to untrained outcomes, they do not assess atten-
tional effects like the standard measures do. We summed the
modified component measures to get an overall relevance index
for blocking and highlighting, respectively, which we used as
manifest variables to replace Blocking and Highlighting (cf. Figure
3). This revised structural equation model, with the correlation
between error terms of the two relevance measures freely esti-
mated, fit well, 2(32)  44.85, comparative fit index (CFI) 
.953, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)  .058,
90% CI [0.0, 0.095], standardized root-mean-square residual
(SRMR)  .0598. The loadings of the blocking (p  .0001) and
highlighting (p  .061) relevance measures on the Error latent
variables imply that the failure of the conventional blocking mea-
sure to load onto the Error latent variable arose because the
measure ignored an important associative aspect of performance.
When the measure is augmented to take this associative aspect in
account, it loads onto the latent variable as expected. Thus, the
apparent discrepancy between our Experiment 1 results and those
of Lewandowsky (2011) can be attributed to a limitation in the
way blocking is conventionally measured.
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Correction to Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012)
The article “Attention and Working Memory Capacity: Insights From Blocking, Highlighting, and
Knowledge Restructuring,” by David K. Sewell and Stephan Lewandowsky (Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: General, 2012, Vol. 141, No. 3, pp. 444–469. doi:10.1037/a0026560) con-
tained a data analysis error, stemming from incorrect data files for three participants being read into
the analysis routine. All of the theoretical inferences based on the outcomes of statistical tests
reported in the article are unchanged in light of the reanalysis. Although the significant reduction
in fit that led the authors to opt for the two-factor structural equation model is now marginally
significant, the two-factor interpretation of the data more cleanly characterizes two conceptually
distinct constructs and thus is still the preferred model. The text corrections and two corrected
figures appear below.
On page 458, the text originally read
For the remaining participants in each condition, performance on the final Categorization Session 1 training
block was highly accurate (M  89% for both the CI-first and KP-first conditions). Training performance
in the final Categorization Session 2 training block was comparably high (Ms  95% and 96% for the
CI-first and KP-first conditions, respectively).
The corrected text should have read
For the remaining participants in each condition, performance on the final Categorization Session 1 training
block was highly accurate (Ms 89% and 93% for CI-first and KP-first conditions, respectively). Training
performance in the final Categorization Session 2 training block was comparably high (M  96% for both
the CI-first and the KP-first conditions).
On page 459, the text that originally read “In the CI-first condition, there was a reduction in context
sensitivity (M  0.62), as people reverted back to the CI strategy, and away from KP,
t(49)  10.57, p  .001, r2  .70,” should have read instead “In the CI-first condition, there was
a reduction in context sensitivity (M  0.68), as people reverted back to the CI strategy and away
from KP, t(49)  13.52, p  .001, r2  .79.”
On page 460, Figure 8 should be replaced with the following figure, which has been updated to be
in line with the corrected analysis.
Figure 8. Context sensitivity across all transfer tests in Experiment 2 for the knowledge-partitioning (KP)-first
and context-insensitive (CI)-first conditions.
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Also on page 460, the entries for Session 2 errors and Session 2 extent of restructuring on Table 8
need to be updated to be in line with the corrected analysis. For Session 2 errors, M  1.02, SD 
0.84, skewness  0.48, and kurtosis  0.48. For Session 2 extent of restructuring, M  0.75,
SD  0.31, skewness  1.42, and kurtosis  1.04.
Again on page 460, the original text reads
The two-factor model fit the data very well, 2(3)  3.42, CFI  .997, RMSEA  .038, 90% CI [0.0, 0.178],
SRMR .0275, with all manifest variables loading in the expected way onto their latent variables. Constraining
the correlation between the Error and Knowledge Restructuring latent variables to unity resulted in a significant
decrement in fit, 2(1)  4.08, p  .04, justifying retention of a second factor in the model.
The corrected text should have read
The two-factor model fit the data very well, 2(3)  2.64, CFI  1.0, RMSEA  .0, 90% CI [0.0, 0.16],
SRMR  .0253, with all manifest variables loading in the expected way onto their latent variables.
Constraining the correlation between the Error and Knowledge Restructuring latent variables to unity
resulted in a marginally significant decrement in fit, 2(1) 3.29, p .07, justifying retention of a second
factor in the model.
On page 461, Figure 9 should be replaced with the updated figure, which includes corrected
parameter estimates for manifest variable loadings onto latent variables and other adjustments.
Figure 9. Structural model for Experiment 2. Significant correlations and factor loadings (all standardized
estimates) are presented in bold. MU  memory updating; OS  operation span; SS  sentence span; SSTM 
spatial short term memory; WMC  working memory capacity; KR  knowledge restructuring.
On pages 460–461, the original text reads
The structural model fit the data well, 2(22) 18.14, p .70, CFI 1.0, RMSEA .0, 90% CI [0.0, 0.066],
SRMR  .0458, and is presented in Figure 9. The correlations among the three latent variables in Figure 9 are
of the most interest. First, there is a strong negative correlation between the Errors latent variable and the
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Knowledge Restructuring latent variable (r  .81), showing that more extensive restructuring was associated with
more accurate learning. Second, WMC was negatively correlated with Errors (r  .43), showing that WMC was
related to fewer errors during learning. This relationship replicates the one we found in Experiment 1 between WMC
and learning and it buttresses other work that has found a uniformly positive link between WMC and category
learning (cf. Craig & Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2011). Finally, there was a
significant positive correlation between WMC and Knowledge Restructuring (r  .36), showing that higher WMC
was related to a greater extent of restructuring.
The corrected text should have read
The structural model fit the data well, 2(22)  16.83, p  .77, CFI  1.0, RMSEA  .0, 90% CI [0.0,
0.059], SRMR  .0470, and is presented in Figure 9. The correlations among the three latent variables in
Figure 9 are of the most interest. First, there is a strong negative correlation between the Errors latent
variable and the Knowledge Restructuring latent variable (r  .80), showing that more extensive
restructuring was associated with more accurate learning. Second, WMC was negatively correlated with
Errors (r  .41), showing that WMC was related to fewer errors during learning. This relationship
replicates the one we found in Experiment 1 between WMC and learning and it buttresses other work that
has found a uniformly positive link between WMC and category learning (cf. Craig & Lewandowsky, 2011;
Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2011). Finally, there was a significant positive correlation
between WMC and Knowledge Restructuring (r  .37), showing that higher WMC was related to a greater
extent of restructuring.
On page 469, the correlations relating to Session 2 performance measures in Table B2 need to be
updated. The table should read as follows:
Table B2
Correlations Between All WMC Tasks and Category Learning and KR Manifest Variables
in Experiment 2
WMC tasks Category learning KR
Variable MU OS SS SSTM S1 (early) S1 (late) S2 (all) KR1 KR2
MU —
OS .37 —
SS .41 .66 —
SSTM .40 .33 .29 —
S1 (early) .28 .23 .14 .25 —
S1 (late) .20 .14 .06 .11 .67 —
S2 (all) .22 .26 .15 .44 .52 .36 —
KR1 .26 .18 .18 .18 .33 .36 .36 —
KR2 .12 .21 .13 .06 .35 .32 .53 .48 —
Note. Working memory capacity (WMC) tasks are as in Table 7. KR  knowledge restructuring; MU 
memory updating; OS operation span; SS sentence span; SSTM spatial short term memory; S1 Session
1 categorization performance; S2  Session 2 categorization performance; KR1  extent of knowledge
restructuring at end of Session 1; KR2  extent of knowledge restructuring at end of Session 2.
DOI: 10.1037/a0035672
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